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This paper explores cryptocurrencies against the backdrop of the history of monetary, banking and
payment systems, from a legal perspective. Providing a historical overview beginning in Antiquity, it
explores just how today’s cyber revolution compares against some key predicate operations, and situates
cryptocurrencies in the context of the long-running evolution of bank payment intermediation and
monetary development.
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I.

Introduction

In the modern economy, payments are typically made by means of transfers through bank
accounts, and otherwise the delivery of cash in the form of banknotes and coins. As conduits of
funds transfers, banks operate as intermediaries between payers and payees. They also distribute
to their customers banknotes issued by the central bank. The recent emergence of
cryptocurrencies, facilitating payments outside the banking system, as well as in items not
created throughout banking operations, has put to test these fundamentals and particularly
challenged the architectural premises of the present banking system.
This paper discusses cryptocurrencies in the context of an historical overview of the
evolution of money, banking and the payment system.1 Part II addresses money, payment and
payment intermediation. Drawing on my previous work,2 Part III sets out the evolution of
commercial banking to facilitate national and global networks for book-based payments. Part IV
takes us to the cyber-age. It addresses both electronic banking as a form of payment
intermediation and the availability to the public of central bank balances as a challenge to
payment intermediation. Cryptocurrencies, as a type of digital currencies, are discussed in Part
V, which goes on to examine the challenge they present to state-issued currency, payment
intermediation, and the roles of banks in the payment systems. The Conclusion points at an
irony: even as a challenge to banking, cryptocurrencies emerged as an outgrowth of an
enhancement to banking. For their parts, centralized digital currencies may be linked to banking
and the legacy monetary system. While changes of unknown scope and magnitude may be
inevitable, banks, ‘banking’, and payment intermediation are unlikely to disappear.
II.

Money, payment and payment intermediation

Money was defined to consist of anything which widely circulate as a medium of
exchange so as to be accepted “in final discharge of debts … without reference to the character
or credit of the person who offers it and without the intention of the person who receives it to
consume it … .“3 Over the centuries, coins and banknotes issued by the authority of the state
have become the standard monetary objects in all countries, so as to collectively be called ‘cash’
or ‘currency.’4
The earliest coins were struck in Lydia (a city-state in Asia Minor) around 700 BCE.5
During Antiquity and the Middle Ages, having evolved from a commodity traded for its use-

1

It has its genesis in “Banking in the Digital Age – Who is Afraid of Payment Disintermediation?” presented in
Frankfurt, Germany on 23 &24 February 2018 at the EBI Global Annual Conference on Banking
Regulation), European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 2018 - no. 23, 59 Pages Posted: 2 Apr 2018;
can be downloaded from: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3153760
2
Particularly Chapters 2, 3, 8, and 10 of Benjamin Geva, The Payment Order of Antiquity and the Middle Ages: A
Legal History (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2011
3
Moss v. Hancock [1899] 2QB 111, 116. To the same effect see also: Reference Re Alberta Statutes [1938] S CR
100, 116, as well as Johnson v. State 52 So. 652 (Ala, 1910) and State v. Finnegean 103 NW 155 (Iowa, 1905).

“Both are not terms of art, so to speak. See e.g. in BA Garner, ed. in chief, Black’s Law
Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul MN: West, 2009) at 245, 440.
4

5

This is the conclusion, confirming the conventional wisdom on the matter, of the thorough study by D. Kagan,
“The Dates of the Earliest Coins” (1982) 86:3 Journal of Archeology 343.
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value into currency transferred in payment of debts,6 the coin became the standard circulating
object denoting a prescribed monetary value.7 It was fundamentally a piece of metal fashioned
into a prescribed shape, weight, and degree of fineness, stamped by the issuer under the authority
of the sovereign with certain designs, marks and devices.8 During the 17th century CE, the
banknote appeared as an obligation to pay coins or specie. Originally, the obligor thereon was a
goldsmith, the predecessor of the deposit bank in England.9 Ultimately, in the course of the 18th
century, following the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694,10 the promise to pay on
banknotes circulating as money became that of the central bank.11
At its inception, and in theory12 until the 19th century CE, the value of a coin, at least its
ideal form, was primarily determined by reference to the weight of the precious metal it
contained. At the same time, by definition, inasmuch as they are mere obligations to pay,
banknotes are ‘fiat money’, namely, of positive nominal value, notwithstanding the (relatively)
worthless intrinsic value of the material of which they are made.13
Until the modern era, a monetary unit of account was anchored in the value of a specified
weight of a prescribed metal. This gave the monetary unit of account its external value in terms
of that metal, and facilitated the establishment of an international system under which the value
of each national unit of account could be ascertained by reference to all other national units of
account.14 Furthermore, until the modern era, the issuer’s obligation to pay, measured by
reference to a unit of account, was to actually pay that amount in specie, at least in coins. In

6

For a comprehensive account see e.g. P. Gardner, A History of Ancient Coinage 700-300 BC (Chicago: Ares
Publishers, 1974, being unchanged reprint of the Edition: Oxford, 1918).
7
Roughly speaking, Antiquity comes to an end with the beginning of the Middle Ages, usually marked by the fall of
Rome in 476 CE. The Middle Ages are commonly dated from the 5th century fall of the Western Roman Empire
until the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire in the 15th century.
8
See in general definitions of ‘coin’ in J. Burke, Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1977) vol. 1 at 368. “Coin in French, signifieth a corner, and from thence hath its name...” See M. Hale,
(d. 1676), The History of the Pleas of the Crown, 1st American ed. by WA Stokes & I. Ingresoll (Philadelphia: RH
Small, 1847) vol. 1 at 187, n. 2.
9
JM Holden, The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law (London: Athlone Press, 1955; rep. Holmes
Beach, Fla: Gaunt, 1993) at 70-73 and A. Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling – A History of English Money, 2nd ed. by
EV Morgan (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963) at 107-08.
10
5 & 6 Will & Mar. c. 20 s. XIX.
11
An act of 1708, 7 Ann. c. 30 s. 66 forfeited the private note-issuing power of banking firms. Subsequently, under
Country Bankers Act, 1826 (U.K.), 7 Geo. IV, c. 46, the note-issue power was restored to non-London bank.
Ultimately, this power was severely curtailed and subsequently disappeared following the passage of the Bank
Charter Act, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 32 in 1844. See Holden, supra note 9 at 87-94, 195-96.
12
For an unequivocal legitimization of the King’s power to control the metallic content of a coin irrespective of its
denomination see Le Case de Mixt Moneys (1605), Davis 18, 80 E.R. 507.
13
See Glossary in TJ Sargent & F. Velde, The Big Problem of Small Change (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2002) at 375. The term is not conceptually different from ‘token money’ referring to a coin not
having the intrinsic value for which it is current. Ibid. at 376.
14
For the history of the international monetary system see e.g R. Lastra, Legal Foundations of International
Monetary Stability (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) at 345-70.
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England, this was originally true for banknotes issued by private bankers,15 and subsequently, to
banknotes issued by the Bank of England.16 For a coin, the issuer’s obligation was in the form of
a guarantee as to its actual metallic content, or at least the redemption thereof.
To this day, current coins and banknotes are typically issued under state authority; at least
for banknotes, the issuer is usually the central bank. However, other than the issue of coins and
banknotes under state authority, by modern times, the framework just described above has been
eroded. First, in the course of the 19th century, the coin reflecting a fraction of the unit of account
became a token, that is, a piece of metal of a value lower than which it denotes. The division of
the basic unit of account into fixed token denominations at equal abstract sub-units17 is called by
economists the “standard formula”.18 Thereunder, the prescribed sum of such token
denominations is convertible at a fixed exchange rate to each other denomination and to the basic
unit, regardless of their own metallic composition.19
Next, in the first half of the 20th century CE, convertibility of banknotes ceased to exist;
that is, the obligation to pay in specie embodied in a banknote became unenforceable.20 Thus, at
present, banknotes and coins express abstract obligations; they are tokens convertible to other
tokens. Finally, during the second half of the 20th century, even the measurement of the unit of
account by reference to a specified quantity of a given precious metal was abolished.21 The
external value of the standard national unit of value is now determined only by reference to the
Such notes “accounted among merchants as ready cash”. See Tassell and Lee v. Lewis (1696), 1 Ld. Raym. 743 at
744, 91 E.R. 1397 at 1398. However, “the acceptance [by a creditor] of … [such a] note is not actual payment.”
Rather, “when such a note is given in payment, it is always intended to be taken under this condition, to be
[absolute] payment [only] if the money be paid [in coin] thereon…” The condition was dispensed with upon the
creditor’s failure to demand payment in coin from the issuer “in convenient time.” Ward v. Evans (1702), 2 Ld.
Raym. 928 at 930, 92 E.R. 120 at 121.
16
Payment in Bank of England notes was held to be as good as “payment…in gold” so as to amount to absolute
discharge. See Currie v. Misa (1875), LR 10 Ex 153 at 164. See also The Guardians of the Poor of the Lichtfield
Union v. Greene (1857), 26 LJ Ex. 140 at 142. At the same time, while being legal tender under s. 6 of the Bank of
England Act 1833 (U.K.), 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98, actual convertibility to specie “had been an essential feature of the
Bank of England Act 1833.” Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspect of Money, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005) at 65.
17
E.g. one dollar for one hundred pennies (each of one cent), twenty nickels (each of five cents), ten dimes (each of
ten cents), or four quarters (each of twenty-five cents).
18
See Sargent & Velde, above note 13 at 5 (as well as Preface at XVII), specifically drawing on CM Cipolla,
Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World, Fifth to Seventh Century (New York: Gordian Press,
1956) at 27. The triumph of the standard formula in the course of the 19 th century is set out by Sargent & Velde,
ibid., at 306-19.
19
That is, one hundred pennies, twenty nickels, ten dimes, or four quarters are convertible to one dollar. Two nickels
are converted to a dime, etc. Each such conversion is irrespective of the metallic content of the sub-unit
denominations (that is, the penny, nickel, dime, or quarter). The “standard formula” preceded the cessation of
convertibility (discussed in the immediately following paragraph); yet, as it is understood today, the “standard
formula” does not rule out (nor does it require) that the basic unit, e.g. the dollar, be convertible or at least anchored
to the value of a specified quantity of a given precious metal.
20
In England, abolition of convertibility goes back to the Gold Standard Act, 1925 (U.K.), 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 29.
Abolition was strengthened in Gold Standard (Amendment) Act, 1931 (U.K.), 21 & 22 Geo. 5, c. 46. See Holden,
supra note 9 at 279.
21
The ‘cutoff’ date is August 15 1971. On that day the US ceased to maintain the purchasing power of the US dollar
in terms of a specified amount of gold. Thereby it effectively abolished the gold (or any other commodity) standard
as the yardstick for the international monetary system. Until then, all currencies had been measured by reference to
the US dollar, which is turn, had been assessed in gold. See Lastra, supra note 14 at 362-63.
15
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value in which that national unit of value is traded in international financial markets by reference
to each other national units of accounts.
Payment in cash is by physical delivery from one person (payer) to another (payee). This
is a face-to-face process which does not requires intermediaries. More specifically, ‘payment’ is
“a bilateral act which requires the [payee] to accept the [payer]’s act of tender”; 22 and is
completed on the passage of possession in the money23 when the payee takes delivery, thereby
manifesting the acceptance of the tender.24
From the beginning, payment in cash had flaws, and under some circumstances was
impractical. Particularly, this is due to costs and risks associated with the storage, carriage and
transportation of cash. Other concerns have been scarcity of cash and the inevitable cumbersome
process of handling and paying in cash large sums of money. In a nutshell, an effective solution
has been in the form of payment made to the payee, under the payer’s instructions, by an
intermediary who typically owed money to the payer.25 Such payment would discharge both the
payer’s debt to the payee and the intermediary’s debt to the payer. An optimal such an
intermediary was a deposit-taker, i.e. banker, being a debtor to all depositors. When payee
preferred payment into payee’s account with another banker (rather than in cash) the two
bankers, that of the payer and that of the payee, settled periodically by paying the balance due for
customers’ payments going in both directions. Bankers kept funds with each other and ultimately
with a central counterparty. Over the centuries, both national and global non-cash payment
systems so evolved.
At the heart of such a system stands the commercial bank. The essence of commercial
banking has been the taking of deposits (or other repayable funds) from the public and lending.26
Linked to these functions is the provision of inter-account payment services.27
Historically, commercial banking (banking) emerged as a form of financial
intermediation between savers (depositors) and borrowers. The banker (or bank)28 took from the
public deposits either in specie or in commodity money; what was deposited was both owed by
the banker to the depositors and at least in part available to be lent by the banker to borrowers.
22

David Fox, Property Rights in Money (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 28.
Hence, contract alone cannot transfer the legal title to money. Fox, ibid. at 87.
24
Fox, ibid. at 79-86, and further, at 87-95.
25
Alternatively, having paid the payee, an intermediary who did not owe money to the payer, became owed by the
payer.
26
See e.g. definition of ‘credit institution’ in Article 4(1)(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment
firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32013R0575, accessed December 22, 2017.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32013R0575, accessed December 22, 2017.
27
Edwin Green, Banking: An Illustrated History (New York: Rizoli, 1989) at 11. For a similar judicial discussion on
the characteristics of banking see Lord Denning MR judgement in United Dominion Trust v. Kirkwood [1966] 2 QB
31 (CA) at 445-447.
28
Grammatically, ’banker’ is the professional individual, while ‘bank’ is the institution. Until incorporation, there
was no real difference and this paper will use to the two terms interchangeably. Note also that ‘commercial
banking’, ‘banking’, and ‘deposit banking’ are, generally speaking, synonyms, and unless indicated otherwise are
used in this paper interchangeably.
23

6

Loans were mostly credited into borrowers’ deposit accounts with the lending bankers in part to
be used by borrowers to make payments. In this environment, payment intermediation in the
form of non-cash payment services evolved as an outgrowth of deposit taking or, more in
general, of maintaining deposit accounts for customers, whether the original depositors, or the
borrowers who deposited the proceeds of the loan.29 This business model has been workable as
long as not all depositors required payment in specie from the banker at the same time. In normal
circumstances, it sufficed for a banker to keep at hand enough specie or cash to satisfy
reasonable demand. Monitoring depositors’ payment activity in accounts facilitated credit
decision-making and led to specialization in advancing information-intensive non-traded loans,
which became a principal niche for a profitable commercial banking business as well as effective
financial intermediation for the economy as a whole.
Already way back in Antiquity30 the evolution of mechanisms for payments initiated by
the issue of payment orders had been part and parcel of the emergence of ‘banking’ as a form of
financial intermediation between depositors to, and borrowers from, the depositary.31
Furthermore, over centuries the architecture of the banking system evolved to satisfy the need to
carry out noncash payment transactions between customers of separate banks by the creation of
interbank networks. For its part, lending out of deposits generated a fractional reserve system
which necessitated the establishment of liquidity facilities to ensure the smooth flow of
payments. Finally, for their part, banknotes, of which at present mainly consists cash, originated
as circulating receipts for deposited funds.

III. Deposit banking, payment services, and paper money: Historical perspective on
payments intermediation
The modern payment system has been described to consist of “a complex set of
arrangements involving such diverse institutions as currency, the banking system, clearing
houses, the central bank, and government deposit insurance.”32 The latter element is helpful but
not universally present; and yet all are components of what can broadly be described as a
commercial (deposit) banking system.

See e.g. Meir Kohn, “Early Deposit Banking” (February 1999) Department of Economics Darmouth College,
Working Paper 99-03, online: <http://sites.dartmouth.edu/mkohn/files/2017/03/99-03.pdf>, accessed 9 January
2018; and James McAndrews and William Roberds, “Payment Intermediation and the Origins of Banking” (August
1999) Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 99-11, online:
<https://www.frbatlanta.org/research/publications/wp/1999/11.aspx>, accessed 9 January 2018. Both studies cover
the Middle Ages and overlook Antiquity.
30
Roughly speaking, Antiquity comes to an end with the beginning of the Middle Ages, usually marked by the fall
of Rome in 476 CE.
31
For an insight into the process, though well into the later Medieval period, see e.g. Abbot Payson Usher, The
Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe vol 1 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1943) particularly at 3-25.
32
MS Goodfriend, “Money, Credit, Banking, and Payment System Policy”, in David B Humphrey, The US Payment
System: Efficiency, Risk and the Role of the Federal Reserve (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990) at 247.
29

7

Notwithstanding the substantial enhancement in complexity and importance of banking in
the modern economy, its fundamentals are not at all novel.33 What follows is an abbreviated
account of the evolution of payment intermediation and that of paper money as an outgrowth of
deposit banking.
(i)

Antiquity

Ancient Mesopotamia has been identified as the cradle of banking operations.34 It earned
this title due to the emergence of institutions providing all core banking activities, namely,
deposit taking, lending35 and payment services even prior to the emergence of ‘monetized’
coins. However, this was a secondary activity for such institutions; moreover, credit was made
available by depositaries out of their own capital36 and without dipping into deposits. 37 As well,
each customer’s deposit may have been physically segregated.38 Payment and withdrawal orders
were inscribed on tablets, and yet could be oral. Each payment order directed the drawee to pay
either to a payee known to the drawee or to a payee to be properly identified.39 Payment was
made in specie; there appears to be neither evidence for the execution of non-cash payments
from one account to another nor any trace of inter-institutional clearing and settlement.
There is a historical debate on the possible origins of money in the Ancient East,
particularly in Mesopotamia; specifically, there is a disagreement on whether distinct items of

But cf. William Linn Westermann, “Warehousing and Trapezite Banking in Antiquity” (1951) 3 Journal of
Economic and Business History 30 at 31 who highlights “a sound contrast between the relatively simple services
rendered by the bank and the banker in antiquity … and the commanding position and complex character of banking
as a function of credit in the economic system of today.” No doubt, such a contrast really exists, and yet it is not on
point in tracing the roots of the modern bank to its predecessor in Ancient Greece.
34
Raymond Bogaert, Les Origines antiques de la banque de dépôt (Leyde: A. W. Sijthoff, 1966) at 129 [Bogaert,
Les Origines]. Roughly speaking, at 41- 129, Bogaert surveys a period extending over 1500 years commencing at
the end of the 21st century BC and covering the Ur III Empire (2112-2004 BCE), the Old Babylonian Period (20001600 BCE) which included the reign of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE), the Middle Assyrian and Middle Babylonian
Periods (1200-750 BCE), and the Neo-Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian Kingdoms (745-539 BCE). Elsewhere in the
book, at 43, Bogaert specifically discounts the existence of any comparable role to Pharaonic Egypt, the other
Ancient Near Eastern civilization.
35
A complex system of lending is traced back in Mesopotamia to the first half of the 2 nd millennium BCE. See in
general, Katrien De Graefe, “Giving a Loan is Like Making Love…” in Koenraad Verboven, Katelijn Vandorpe &
Véronique Chankowski, eds, Pistoi Dia Tèn Technèn-Bankers, Loans and Archives in the Ancient World: Studies in
Honour of Raymond Bogaert (Leuven: Peeters, 2008) at 3 [Verboven et al., Ancient World].
36
Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 34 at 174.
37
The gradual erosion during the first millennium BCE, culminating approximately at the first part of its second
half, is noted by Francis Joannès, “Les activités bancaires en Babylonie” in Verboven et al., Ancient World, supra
note 35 at 17, 19. The claim set out in Alexander Lipton and Alex “Sandy” Pentland, “Breaking the Banks: New
Financial Networks Could stop the Concentration of Wealth and Increase Participation in the Economy –But only If
Handled with Care” (January 2018) 318:1 Scientific American 26 who identify the origins of fractional lending out
of deposits “more than 5,000 years ago in the Mesopotamian city of Ur” is supported by neither Joannès, ibid nor
Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 34 to whose expertise I prefer to defer.
38
Bogaert, Les Origines, note 34 at 59, 84 n.236, 99 and nn. 311-313 & text, supra.
39
Bogaert, Les Origines, ibid. at 99. For written orders issued by a lender temple directed to a warehouse or granary
at the locality of the payee- borrower see Bogaert, ibid. at 54. An order to a non-depositary obligor could be either
written or oral. Ibid. at 100.
33
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value were actually used exclusively as means of payments, and thus approximated coins.40
However, it seems to be universally agreed that nascent ‘banking operations’ in Mesopotamia
preceded the emergence of money, in the sense of standardized metallic pieces, in fixed
denominations, whose value is certified by the ruler's stamp.41 Rather, various commodities
served as both units of account and means of payment. Based on their comparative or relative
value, such commodities served as a basis for a price system, as well as actual means or money
of payment. Principal commodities were grain and precious metal, usually barley and silver.42
Having both (i) actual use value or intrinsic utility, and (ii) economic value facilitating their use
to provide a standardized means for both the measurement for the value of other commodities as
well for paying for all such other commodities, such items constituted ‘primitive money’.43
The emergence of the bank as a distinct type of institution took place in Ancient
Greece.44 More specifically, the process took place in the Mediterranean territory on which
Ancient Greek civilization expanded,45 almost throughout the entire classical period of that
civilization.46

Proponents include M. Balmuth, “The Monetary Forerunners of Coinage in Phoenicia and Palestine” in A.
Kindler, ed., The Patterns of Monetary Development in Phoenicia and Palestine in Antiquity (Tel Aviv: Schocken,
1967) (Proceedings of the International Numismatic Commission, The Israeli Numismatic Society, International
Numismatic Convention, Jerusalem 1963) at 25; M. Balmuth, “The Critical Moment: the transition from currency to
coinage in the eastern Mediterranean” (1975), 6 World Archeology 293; and J. Dayton, “Money in the Near East
Before Coinage” (1974), 23 Berytus Archaeological Studies 41. For a critique see MA Powell, “A contribution to
the History of Money in Mesopotamia prior to the Invention of Coinage” in B. Hruška & G. Komoróczy, eds.,
Festschrift Lubor Matouš, Volume 2 (Budapest, Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem, Ókori Történeti Tanszek 1978)
at 211. Another skeptic is P. Grierson, The Origins of Money (London: The Athlone Press, 1977, being the
Creighton Lecture in History, 1970) at 8 & n. 7.
41
The earliest coins were struck in Lydia (a city-state in Asia Minor) around 700 BCE. See Part II, supra.
42
See in general RFG Sweet, On Prices, Money and Money Uses in the Old Babylonian Period (Unpublished Ph. D
dissertation submitted to the Department of Oriental Languages and Civilizations of the University of Chicago, IL,
1958, available through UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor Michigan); and MA Powell, “Identification and
Interpretation of Long Term Price Fluctuations in Babylonia: More on the History of Money in Mesopotamia”
(1990), 17 Altorientalische Forschungen 76. See also JN Postgate, above note 10, who in discussing (at 202-205)
currency, observed (at 204) that “In the early second millennium, silver was the preferred currency of the merchant
classes and perhaps of the administration, but even in the Old Babylonian times … the administration and the private
sector regularly used [also] barley to fulfil much the same function, and other commodities are also attested.”
43
According to P. Einzig, Primitive Money, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966) at 317, primitive money was “a
unit or an object conforming to a reasonable degree to some standard of uniformity, which is employed for
reckoning or for making a large proportion of the payments customary in the community concerned, and which is
accepted in payment largely with the intention of employing it for making payments.” For primitive money see also
AJ Toynbee, A Study of History, Abridgement of Volumes VII-X by DC Somervell (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957) at 60 and in this study, Chapter 2, Section 1, particularly §1.2, above.
44
The ensuing discussion draws on Raymond Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les cités grecques (Leyde: A.W.
Sijthoff, 1968) at 50-60 and 331-345 [Bogaert, Banques et banquiers]; Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 34 at 130158; Edward E Cohen, Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective (Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1992) at 8-11, 14-18, 62-66 and 111-121.
45
Roughly speaking this territory covers Mainland Greece, Greek Islands (together roughly coinciding with the area
of modern-day Greece), and the western coast of Asia Minor or Anatolia (the latter of which is part of modern-day
Turkey).
46
The Classical Period is said to have lasted between 500 and 336 BCE. It was preceded by the Archaic Period
(stretching from 750 to 500 BCE) and followed by the Hellenistic Period (taking place between 336 and 146 BCE).
The latter commences with Alexander the Great (336 to 323 BCE) under whose reign Greek civilization extended
40
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Thus, in the course of the 6th century BCE, shortly after the appearance of coined money
as a medium of exchange in commercial transactions,47 money changing surfaced as a
profession. Shortly thereafter, the moneychanger came to accept deposits of coined money, mix
them,48 lend out of them, so as to gradually become a banker. A banker effectively kept a
running account for each customer, posting to it each deposit and withdrawal.49 A withdrawal
from a customer’s account could be made for the entire or part of a balance due on deposited
money, either by the depositor himself, or by a designated payee (or on his behalf) in pursuance
to the depositor’s instruction.
For each payment to a designated payee, having received the payment order and being in
possession of cover, the payer’s banker sent a note to the payee. Having made an appropriate
entry on his books in the payee’s favour, the banker became accountable to the payee, regardless
of whether the payee kept an account with that banker. A payee who did not have an account of
the payer’s bank could demand payment in cash. Alternatively, where the advice note issued by
the payer’s banker was made out to the payee ‘or order’, the payee could appoint an agent,
usually another banker, to come to the payer’s banker and claim on the payee’s behalf payment
in cash over the counter. In the further alternative, the payee’s banker may have been prepared to
act on the basis of the advice note issued to the payee by the payer’s banker. In such a case, upon
the presentment of the advice note, the payee’s banker credited the payee’s account in advance,
in anticipation of subsequent payment by the payer’s banker. Payment by payer’s banker to the
payee’s banker could be effectuated either in coins, or as part of either bilateral or multilateral
setoff. No interbank clearing system, whether bilateral or multilateral, existed in Ancient
Greece.50

eastwards where it met and mingled with Eastern civilization. For time periods in the history of Ancient Greece you
may visit <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_ancient_Greece>, accessed 27 December 2017.
47
. Both the production and use of coined money were expanded towards the end of the 6 th and beginning of the 5th
century BCE. See in general, Arthur R Burns, Money and Monetary Policy in Early Times (New York: A.M. Kelley,
1965, reprint of 1927) at 43-45.
48
On the theory that the depositary thus became indebted for the amount of the deposit rather than to return it in
specie, Bogaert, Banques et banquiers supra note 44 at 333 treats such a deposit as ‘irregular’ in the sense
subsequently given to it by the Romans. In the view of Cohen, supra note 44 at 112-113 this is however an
anachronism.
49
On the evolution of accounting in Greece see e.g. Léopold Migeotte, “La compatabilité publique dans les cités
Grecques: l’exemple de Délos” in Verboven et al., Ancient World, supra note 35 at 59, and Véronique Chankowski,
“Banquiers, caissiers, comptables. À propos des méthodes financières dans les comptes de Délos” in Verboven et al.,
Ancient World, supra note 35 at 77.
50
Bogaert, Banques et banquiers supra note 44 at 344-345 and 413.
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Compared to Ancient Greece, the institutional scene in Ancient Rome51 was more
complex;52 and yet, this complexity did not lead to an overall advancement in banking practices.
Nonetheless, in three major respects Roman banking practice went beyond that of the Greek.
First, the receiver-banker could be treated as the first money transmitter, to whom funds are
delivered with the view of making a specific payment. However, money transmission by a
receiver-banker may have developed under narrow circumstances, in the context of private
auctions, 53 and in any event did not extend to cover payments between geographically distant
parties. Second, as in Ancient Greece, there was in Ancient Rome neither an intra-city nor
intercity multilateral interbank clearing and settlement system.54 However, nascent interbank
correspondent arrangements, under which one bank held funds in an account with the other,
developed, particularly in the same city,55 but also in different cities so as to facilitate payments
between geographically distant parties.56 A non-cash payment could have been carried out
between accounts of two depositors, either in the same bank, or in two banks situated in the same
small town or within a specific market, whether permanent or periodic.
Third, deposit bankers operated under strict bookkeeping requirements, and were
obligated to record their monetary operations in account books called rationes. An account book
(ratio in singular) was also known as a ratio accepti et expensi (‘an account of deposits and
payments’) and ratio implicita proper accepta et data (‘a complex account including both
51

Between around 500 BCE and 30 CE the Roman Republic grew from a city state to dominate first Italy, then the
Western Mediterranean and, finally, the entire Mediterranean basin. In the process, Rome had undergone a
fundamental change in its system of government and came to be the Roman Empire. The City of Rome ultimately
fell at 476 CE, an event which marks the end of the Roman period in the West. An outline of Roman history can be
found, for example, at <http://www.forumromanum.org/history/>, accessed 28 December 2017. In 320 CE Emperor
Constantine chose Byzantium (present-day Istanbul) as the new capital of the Empire and renamed it
Constantinopolis. He officially divided the Empire into an Eastern and Western Empires in 395 CE. The Eastern
Empire survived for close to 1,000 years after the fall of Rome, until Constantinopolis fell to the hands of the
Ottoman Turks in 1453 CE, except that particularly as of the rise of Islam at the 7th century CE it had been
considerably weakened long before its ultimate fall.
52
For this institutional framework see e.g. Jean Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 30-49 [translated by Janet Lloyd] [Andreau, Banking] at 30-49; as well as
Koenraad Verboven, “Faeneratores, Negotiatores, and Financial Intermediation in the Roman World (Late Republic
and Early Empire)” in Verboven et al., Ancient World, supra note 35 at 211; and Koenraad Verboven, “The Sulpicii
from Puteoli, argentarii or faeneratores?” in Pol Defosse, ed, Hommages à Carl Deroux; III –Histoire et
épigraphie, Droit (Bruxelles: Éditions Latomus, 2003) at 429. See also Peter Temin, “Financial Intermediation in
the Early Roman Empire” (2004) 64.3 Journal of Economic History 705.
53
See in general, Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider, eds, Brill’s New Pauly Encyclopedia of the Ancient World:
Antiquity, vol 2 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003) at 331 (v. “Auctiones”). See also G. Humbert, “Auctio”, in Charles
Victor Daremberg and Edmond Saglio, eds, Dictionnaire Des Antiquités Greques et Romaines vol 1, Part 1 (Graz:
Akademische Durck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1969) at 543. For the controversy as to the role the banker played in a public
auction see e.g. Fritz Sturm, “Stipulation argentaria” in Felix Bernard Joseph Wubbe & Johan Albert Ankum,
Mélanges Felix Wubbe: offerts par ses collègues et ses amis à l’ocassion de son soixante-dixiéme anniversaire
(Fribourg: Éditions universitaire, 1993) at 453, 460-63; Hans Ankum, “Quelques problèmes concernant les ventes
aux enchères en droit romain classique”, Studi in onore di Gaetano Scherillo, vol 1, 377 (Milan: Cisalpino-La
goliardica, 1972); and JAC Thomas, “The Auction in Roman Law” (1957) Juridical Review 42.
54
Notwithstanding Sam Maxwell, De la délégation en droit romain (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Ve Cadoret, 1895) at
111.b
55
See Andreau, Banking, supra note 52 at 43, who specifically claims that in the Roman world “[t]here was no
system of institutionalized compensation between banks of the same city.”
56
See Jean G Platon, Les Banquiers dans la législation de Justinien (Premiére partie) (Paris: Librairie Recuil Sirey,
1912) at 108-09.
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deposits and payments’). A deposit banker was required to make such books available for
production in a trial involving a client, even where the deposit banker was not a party to the
litigation.57 For his part, the deposit banker was obligated to maintain books, to account for the
various entries, and to state a balance owed between himself and the customer.58
Payment services were operated in conjunction with deposit banking in Greco-Roman
Egypt. Public granaries in Greco-Roman Egypt, connected into a network of grain depositaries,
operated a countrywide system of payment in agricultural products, such as oil and wine.
Particularly however, they ran grain warehouse banking, facilitating payments out of and into
deposits of grain, for both public authorities and individuals.60 The system maintained grain
accounts and recorded transfers. For each yearly harvest of each type of grain the various
deposits were physically amalgamated so that credit to an account reflected a claim to a share in
the mixture rather than to a physically segregated or separate deposit; it seems though, that no
lending was made out of the mixture, so that full reserve was held to back all credits to the
deposit accounts.61
59

Book-based transfers could occur between accounts in the same granary, same region, or
different regions. For an inter-granary transfer, an adjustment was made not only to transferor’s
and transferee’s accounts, but also over a system of inter-granary accounts.62 A comprehensive
account management system thus existed in each granary, in each region, as well as in
Alexandria, from which the entire system was overseen. Effectively, this was the forerunner for a

57

See Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1953)
at 366-367 (v. “Argentarii”).
58
Edmond Guillard, Les Banquiers Athéniens et Romains suivis du Pacte de Constitut en Droit Romain (Paris,
Lyon: Guillaumin, H. Georg, 1875) at 52 sets out these obligations and discusses them at length in 52-79.
59
Following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE, and after the ensuing partition of his empire, Egypt fell
into Ptolemy’s hands. His successors, the Ptolemies, ruled Egypt until 30 BCE when the country was conquered by
the Romans. With the partition of the Roman Empire in the course of the 4 th century CE, the Byzantines succeeded
the Romans; they stayed in power until 642 CE, when the Arabs took over and the Islamic epoch commenced. For
Egypt, the entire era of close to a millennium, between Alexander the Great and the introduction of Islam, is loosely
referred to as Greco-Roman. This historical sketch draws on <http://www.sis.gov.eg/section/0/701?lang=en-us>,
accessed 27 December 2017, and <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_the_Great>, accessed 27 December
2017. See also <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Empire>, accessed 27 December 2017, and
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_conquests>, accessed 27 December 2017.
60
The system is concisely described by Claire Préaux, L’Économie royale des Lagides (Bruxelles: Édition de la
Fondation Égyptogique, 1939) at 142, as well as by Michael Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the
Hellenistic World, vol 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941) at 1287. See also Gyles Davies, A History of Money: from
Ancient Times to Present Day, 3rd ed (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002) at 52-55 and Westermann, supra
note 33 at 32-33. The authoritative text relied by all is in German: Friedrich Preisigke, Girowesen im griechischen
Ägypten (Strassburg: Verlad von Schlesier & Schweikhardt, 1910) [Reprinted: Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms
Verlag, 1971], discussing the grain giro system at 62-184, particularly at 89-92, 101-102, and 128-130 (see also
relevant translated documents reproduced at 147-173), in connection with which I had the benefit of a partial
unofficial translation.
61
For this understanding of the system (on the basis of Westermann’s article, supra note 33) see Jeffery Williams,
“Fractional Reserve Banking in Grain” (1984) 16 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 488 at 488 n. 1.
62
For example, a transfer from a Depositor A in Granary A to a depositor B in Granary B, resulted not only in an
adjustment of Depositors’ accounts, but also in an adjustment that reflected the claim of Granary B on Granary A
where the grain in the amount of the transfer remained kept.
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nationwide credit-push giro mechanism,63 under which payment orders were executed by means
of crediting and debiting accounts.64 The system was however doomed to wither away together
with the disappearance of specie and kind as universal mediums of exchange.65
So far as the monetary economy of Greco-Roman Egypt66 was concerned, the banking
system formed a network and assumed a key role in carrying out treasury operations for the
central government and other public authorities. Each regional royal bank operated in
conjunction with a network of village banks, which effectively functioned as branch offices for
royal banks or more precisely, as points of collections and disbursements of funds67 throughout
the various districts of the country. However, the Royal Treasury, or the basilicon, in
Alexandria,68 did not serve as a central bank;69 it neither maintained accounts for all deposits
throughout the country, nor received surplus balances for such accounts, other than for the king.
Nor did the basilicon oversee the operation of the entire network; it did not even maintain
accounts for the various royal banks into which adjustments for inter-district transfers could be
made. Rather, each royal bank kept a separate set of records for its own account holders.
Effectively, together with its village bank network, a royal bank operated as a standalone
‘Giro’ (coming from Greek 'gigros’, and meaning ring, circular or cyclical) usually narrowly denotes a ‘creditpush’ mechanism for a non-cash payment between two accounts (as in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giro, accessed
27 December 2017). Alternatively, it may more broadly denote any bookkeeping transfer (as in Westermann, supra
note 33 at 49) or transfer operations (as in Rostovtzeff, supra note 60 at 1279). In this latter (broad) sense it is any
non-cash payment between two bank accounts, regardless of whether it is a ‘credit-push’ or ‘debit-pull’ mechanism.
64
Possibly also, circulating credit notes attesting to credit posted to a grain account are said to have been used as
payment devices. See e.g. Roger S Bagnall and Raymond Bogaert, “Orders for Payment from A Banker’s Archive:
Papyri in the Collection of Florida State University” (1975), in Raymond Bogaert, Trapezitica Aegyptiaca: Recueil
de recherches sur la banque en Égypte Gréco-Romaine (Firenze: Edizioni Gonelli, 1994) at 240 [Trapezitica]. No
mention of such credit notes appears in Preisigke, supra note 60.
65
And yet, a temporary revival of grain banking, consisting also of lending out of amalgamated deposits, occurred in
the Chicago in the course of the 19th century. See Williams, supra note 61.
66
Bogaert researched and wrote extensively on the subject. His work, consisting of 20 articles, mostly in French, to
1994 (originally published elsewhere) is collated in Trapezitica, supra note 64. Six subsequent articles (which are
thus not part of the collection) are Raymond Bogaert, "Liste géographic des banques et des banquiers de l'Égypte
romaine, 30A-284” (1995) 109 Zeitschrift-für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 133; Raymond Bogaert, “La Banque en
Égypte Byzantine” (1997) 116 Zeitschrift-fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik 85; Raymond Bogaert, “Les opérations
des banques de l’Égypte Ptolémaïque” (1998) 29 Ancient Society 49; Raymond Bogaert, “Liste géographique des
banques et des banquiers de l’Égypte Ptolémaïque” (1998) 120 Zeitschrift-für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 165;
Raymond Bogaert, "Les opérations des banques de l’Égypte romaine" (2000) 30 Ancient Society 135; and Raymond
Bogaert, “Les documents bancaires de l’Égypte Gréco-Romaine et Byzantine” (2001) 31 Ancient Society 173.
Bogaert commenced the first of these last six articles ("Liste geographic” (1995), ibid at 133 text at n. 1) by
conceding that for health reasons he had abandoned his plan to synthesize his extensive research on banks in GrecoRoman Egypt into a monograph. Since then, he unfortunately passed away (in October 2009). A recent work
covering the first part of the period is Sitta von Reden, Money in Ptolemaic Egypt: From the Macedonain Conquest
to the End of the Third Century BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 257-296.
67
From a modern perspective, they were not ‘bank branches’ as, per explanation that immediately follows, they did
not maintain on their books the principal accounts of their customers.
68
Bogaert’s tentative statement to that effect in Bogaert, “Le statut des banques en Égypte Ptolémaïque” (1981),
Trapezitica, supra note 64 at 56 as well as in Bogaert, “Recherches sur la banque en Égypte Gréco-Romaine”
(1987), Trapezitica, supra note 64 at 6 is expressed more confidently in Bogaert, “Les opérations des banques de l’
Égypte Ptolémaïque” supra note 66 at 117.
69
Among others, this has been a contested point. The present analysis follows Bogaert, who on this issue determined
against the existence of a central bank in Alexandria. For his view on the point, in conjunction with a survey of the
debate, see e.g. Bogaert, “Le statut des banques en Égypte Ptolémaïque” ibid at 47.
63
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independent bank. It follows that there was no infrastructure facilitating a countrywide system
for inter-district non-cash payments from an account in one royal bank to an account in another.
Throughout the Ptolemaic era,70 both royal and private banks maintained deposit
accounts for individuals.71 Available documentation supports the existence of funds transfers
from one account to another72 in private banks73 as well as for tax payments from accounts
maintained in royal banks.74 Documentation further supports the existence of bilateral
correspondent relations between private banks, namely instances where one bank holds an
account with another.75At the same time, there is no indication of any multilateral bank clearing
arrangement; and certainly, any claim to the existence in Greco-Roman Egypt of a “centralized
state giro system”76 is not well founded.
Royal banks in Ptolemaic Egypt pioneered a nascent cheque system.77 The drawer would
issue a non-transferable cheque to the payee and send a ‘control note’ to the drawee bank which
would match it with the cheque upon its presentation. Cheques were non-transferable. The payee
would present the cheque to the payer’s bank, either in person or through an agent, and be paid
usually in cash Alternatively, the payee could have his account credited with the payer’s bank. In
the further alternative, where the payer’s bank kept an account with the payee’s bank, payee
would instruct the payer’s banker to draw on the payee’s banker a cheque payable to the payee.
The payee would then present that cheque to the payee’s bank, which would then debit the
account of the payer’s bank and credit that of the payee. Being drawn by one bank on another,
the cheque issued by the payer’s bank was the forerunner of a bank draft or money order. 78
Cheque use has been eclipsed in Egypt in the course of the Roman period.79
(ii)

Middle Ages

70

The Ptolemies, ruled Egypt following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE until 30 BCE when the
country was conquered by the Romans. See note 59 supra.
71
Bogaert, “Les opérations des banques de l’Égypte Ptolémaïque”, supra note 66 respectively at 113-116, 124-128,
135-142.
72
Bogaert, ibid.
73
Bogaert, ibid at 136-137.
74
Bogaert, ibid at 115.
75
Bogaert, ibid at 135.
76
Davies, supra note 60 at 92.
77
Bogaert, Banques et banquiers supra note 44 at 340-341, particularly at text at n. 206; Roger. S. Bagnall and
Raymond Bogaert, “Orders for Payment from A Banker’s Archive: Papyri in the Collection of Florida State
University” (1975), in Trapezitica, supra note 64 at 219
78
For legal aspects of these instruments under modern law see e.g. Benjamin Geva, "Irrevocability of Bank Drafts,
Certified Cheques and Money Orders" (1987), 65 Can. Bar Rev. 107.
79
For a cheque from Roman Egypt from 125 CE, giving rise to a dispute involving the unavailability of funds to
cover payment, see R. Bogaert, “Recherches sur la banque en Égypte Gréco-Romaine” (1987), Trapezitica, supra
note 64 at 6, 23.
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In West Europe, during the early centuries of the Middle Ages,80 the economy collapsed
and trade was reduced to a trickle. Monetary economy survived only in a rudimentary form81 and
banks disappeared from the West after the 4th century CE.82 Banking services reappeared in
Europe in the later part of the Middle Ages to satisfy the growing demands of trade. “Genoa
happens to preserve the earliest notarial minute books that have survived (from 1154 on) …
[which] are the first source that contains a fairly large number of documents showing bankers at
work.”83 Deposit banking, in the form of taking deposits and lending out of them in the
depositary’s own name was reborn in Italy and ‘exported’ elsewhere84 in the course of the 12th
and 13th centuries, as part of a commercial revolution that took place as of the 11th century or
so.85
As originally in Ancient Greece, it was the moneychanger who commenced to take
deposits, mix them, and lend out of them. By 1350, in becoming bankers,86 moneychangers
developed a system of local payments by book transfers, with the view of eliminating “[t]he
great inconvenience of making all payments in specie, especially the waste of time involved in
counting coin.”87 The system that developed was strictly local; no facility for inter-city book
transfers is known to have existed throughout the Middle Ages.
Thus, between late 13th and early 14th century the moneychangers of Venice, the
campsores, became bankers.88 They accepted deposits, lent out of them, and provided book

80

The fall of Rome in 476 CE marks the end of Antiquity and the beginning of the Middle Ages. For Western
Europe, the end of the Middle Ages is marked by the discovery of the New World in 1492, or perhaps slightly later,
in the early 16th century, by the division of Western Christianity in the Reformation, the rise of humanism in the
Italian Renaissance, and the beginnings of European overseas expansion. These propositions are common
knowledge. See in general e.g. http://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Ages, accessed 27 December 2017.
81
Robert S Lopez, “The Dawn of Medieval Banking”, in Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University
of California, Los Angeles, ed, The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1979) at 1, 3-5. For payments in kind assessed in monetary value and on occasion supplemented with low-value
coins that took place in the Carolingian Empire (8 th century CE), see e.g. Alexander Murray, Reason and Society in
the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, rep. 2002) at 31-35.
82
Bogaert, Les Origines, supra note 34 at 163-165.
83
Lopez, supra note 81 at 10.
84
See e.g. André-E Sayous, “Les opérations des banquiers Italiens en Italie et aux Foires de Champagne pendant le
XIIIe siècle” (1932) 170 Revue Historique 1 [Sayous, “banquiers Italiens”]; and M. Prestwich, “Italian Merchants in
Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Century England” in Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University
of California, Los Angeles, ed, The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1979) at 77.
85
The revolution occurred in the aftermath of the feudal anarchy of the manorial economy of the Dark Ages. For a
detailed discussion on this general context, see Raymond de Roover, “Chapter II: The Organization of Trade”, in
MM Postan, EE Rich & E. Miller, eds, The Cambridge Economic History of Europe Volume 3: Economic
Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963, rep. 1979) at 42 [de
Roover, “The Organization of Trade”].
86
Raymond de Roover, “New Interpretations of the History of Banking”, in Julius Kirshner, ed, Business, Banking,
and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1974, Phoenix Edition 1976) at 213 [de Roover, “New
Interpretations”].
87
See Raymond De Roover, “What is Dry Exchange?” in Julius Kirshner, ed, Business, Banking, and Economic
Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of Raymond de Roover (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1974, Phoenix Edition 1976) 183 at 184 [de Roover, “Dry Exchange”].
88
Sir William S Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 8 (London: Methuen & Co., Sweet and Maxwell, 2 nd ed:
1937, rep. 1966) at 178.
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transfer payment services from and to current accounts kept with them.89 To eliminate fraud, a
book transfer required the attendance of both payer and payee at the bank.90 Ultimately, in some
cases, the payer’s attendance could be dispensed with and the payer’s banker was prepared to act
on the payer’s instruction presented by the payee. The Medieval non-transferable cheque was
thus born, as a payment order issued by the payer to the payee instructing the payer’s banker to
pay to the payee, as well as authorizing the payee to collect from the banker. It was however not
widely used.91
Bankers held accounts with each other which possibly allowed for intra-city interbank
transfers92 which may have been settled only on irregular intervals. Each bank kept with it only
a fractional reserve, namely, a limited amount of coined money, ready to satisfy an anticipated
demand for cash withdrawal; it lent or invested most of the money received on deposit.
Availability of payment by book transfers, recognized by early 14th century legislation in Venice,
allowed banks to reduce cash holdings and increase their investments and credit extensions.
However, throughout the Continent, during the 15th century, private deposit banks
declined. Repeated bank failures undermined the confidence of merchants and further triggered
hostility by public authorities.93 Together with a chronic shortage of good coins, the increased
risk in keeping money with a banker led to a devaluation of “bank money” compared to that of
“coined money”.94 Ultimately, in a process that “did not gain momentum until the last quarter of
the sixteenth century,” public banks gradually replaced private banks in commercial centres.95
See in detail: Reinhold Mueller, “The Role of Bank Money in Venice, 1300-1500”, in Fondazione Giorgio Cini et
al., eds, Studi veneziani (NS) vol 3 (Pisa: Giardini, 1979) at 47.
90
De Roover, “New Interpretations”, supra note 86 at 215, 216; R. De Roover, L’Evolution de la Lettre de Change
e
XIV – XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953) [hereafter: De Roover, lettre de change] at 208. See
also at 212-13. In these three pages he summarizes the views of Bartolo Da Sassofferato (1314-1357); Baldo Degli
Ubaldi (1327-1400); and Giasone Del Maino (1435-1519). De Roover acknowledges (ibid. at 208) Bartolo’s text to
be “obscure” but claims to follow its usual interpretation including by the two other jurists. Ibid. at 85-87. See also
Usher, Deposit Banking above note 31 at 90, speaking of “the custom of transacting all important business in person
if possible” as facilitated by “[t]he compactness of medieval and early modern towns and the concentration of the
commercial community…”
91
See in general, De Roover, “New Interpretations”, Ibid. at 216-17 as well as Usher, Deposit Banking above note
31 at 90-94. For an extensive discussion, see M. Spallanzani, “A Note on Florentine Banking in the Renaissance:
Orders of Payment and Cheques” (1978), 7:1 Journal of European Economic History 145. The author points out
(e.g. at 146) the difficulty in identifying with certainty those payment orders which are cheques. Furthermore, his
definition of “cheque” (at 148), as “an order of payment issued on a bank … by someone who has funds available”
is too broad and in effect does not distinguish between cheques and other payment orders. At the same time, my
overall impression from the article is that he speaks of a “cheque” in the correct sense.
92
But contrary to Mueller, ibid at 74-76, Mark Manning, Eriend Nier & Jochen Schanz, eds, The Economics of
Large-value Payments and Settlement: Theory and Policy Issues for Central Banks (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009) at 24 find “no conclusive evidence” for interbank transfers in Medieval Venice.
93
De Roover, “New Interpretations” supra note 86 at 219.
94
Frederic C Lane, Venice A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973) at 328-29 [Lane,
Venice]; for the same phenomenon in Venice at a later period see ibid at 402. See also Frederic C Lane, “Venetian
Bankers, 1496-1533: A Study in the Early Stages of Deposit Banking” (1937) 45 Journal of Political Economy 187
at 200-01 [Lane, “Venetian”].
95
de Roover, “New Interpretations”, supra note 86 at 223. For a discussion of the public bank in Venice as a
successor of the private bank system that failed primarily due to excessive lending by means of simple book entries,
see Charles F Dunbar, “The Bank of Venice” (1892) 6 Quarterly Journal of Economics 308; and Gino Luzzatto,
“Les banques publiques de Venise (Siècles XVI-XVIII)” in Johannes Gerard van Dillen, ed, History of the Principal
89

16

Heralding this development, Venice gave rise to a “distinctive style” of banking, referred to as
giro banking, under which the primary purpose of banks was the making of payments on behalf
of customers rather than making loans.96 For its part, The Bank of Amsterdam, “established in
1609 under the guarantee of the city,”97 was a leader among the post-Medieval public banks.98
During the late Middle Ages, and to accommodate intercity commerce, exchange banking
evolved in Continental Europe side by side with deposit banking.99 It was practiced by large
merchants who lent to exporters located in one market, who in turn sent goods for sale in another
market. Repayment was made out of the proceeds of the sale, in the destination market, by the
seller’s correspondent to the lender’s correspondent in that market.100 This practice gave rise to
the bill of payment, being the predecessor of the bill of exchange.101 For their part, exchange
bankers formed an intercity network that gave rise to the emergence of an elaborate multilateral
clearing and settlement arrangement, implemented by them periodically in medieval fairs.102

Public Banks (London: Frank Cass, 1964, being 2nd impression of the 1934 1st edition, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1934) at 39.
96
Lane, Venice supra note 94 at 147. See also Lane, “Venetian” supra note 94 at 187 specifically rejecting earlier
such institutions and stating that “Giro banks did not come into existence until the late sixteenth century, at Venice
in 1584…”
97
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976; being the 1776 original text,
edited by E. Cannan and prefaced by GJ Stigler, ‘Two Volumes in One’) vol 1 at 504.
98
See e.g. Johannes Gerard van Dillen, “The Bank of Amsterdam”, in van Dillen, ed, supra note 95 at 79; Adam
Smith, ibid at 503-13; Pit Dehing & Marjolein C. ’t Hart, “Linking the Fortunes: Currency and Banking, 1550-1800”
in Marjolein ’T Hart, Joost Jonker & Jan Luiten van Zanden, eds, A Financial History of the Netherlands
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 45-51; and Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, “The Big
Problem of Large Bills: The Bank of Amsterdam and the Origins of Central Banking” (2007) [For a former version,
see Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Papers Series, Working Paper 2005-16, August 2005 (albeit the latter
contains lots of econometrics which is inaccessible to a non-specialist such as myself)]. For money and banking in
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(iii)

Post-Medieval Era

Against this background the modern banking system, accommodating the present
payment system, was born in post-medieval England. Its roots are in the institutional
transformation of the goldsmiths’ system and the establishment of the Bank of England that
followed.103
The process involved (i) the transformation of the business of individual goldsmiths into
that of deposit bankers who accepted deposits, and lent out of them, including by discounting
bills of exchange. As bankers they also facilitated depositors’ cheque payments out of and into
the deposits; (ii) the existence of a tight network of all such goldsmiths ready to extend credit to
each other, so as to allow for reciprocal correspondent banking services. Such services have
facilitated interbank debt clearing and settlement, originally on a bilateral and later on a
multilateral basis, leading to the establishment of a clearing house. This allowed risk reduction,
enhanced efficiency, and the generation of common services that brought upon further
development;104 (iii) the establishment of the Bank of England, originally as a lender to the
government and then, having adopted goldsmiths’ practices, gradually evolving in the
subsequent two centuries into a modern central bank. As such it maintains settlement accounts
for deposit bankers (being the successors of goldsmiths) so as to facilitate interbank final
settlement as well as to become a lender of last resort;105 and (iv) the issuance of banknotes, first
as circulating obligations of goldsmiths evidencing either deposits or loans, then as paper money
issued by the goldsmiths, and ultimately, as paper money, ‘legal tender’, exclusively issued by
the Bank of England.106
Both correspondent banking and customer payment activity required intensive
monitoring by the goldsmith-bankers. In turn, this facilitated credit decision-making and led to
specialization in advancing information-intensive non-traded loans. Such lending became a
principal niche for a profitable commercial banking business as well as effective financial
intermediation for the economy as a whole. In providing such loans, as well as in issuing
banknotes and discounting bills of exchange, the goldsmith-bankers came to provide a reliable
source of liquidity to the economy.
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For its part, in departing from the model of the earlier Continental public bank, the Bank
of England complemented private commercial banks without competing with or endeavouring to
substitute for them. Rather, being their bank maintaining for them accounts, 107 it became able to
furnish them with a source of liquidity so as to be a lender of last resort. As well, it provided
them with the efficiency of multilateral settlement in reserve accounts held with it. In both ways,
it gradually became as a ‘central bank’ an integral part of the private bank network.108
The banknote was issued first by the goldsmith-banker,109 originally possibly as a
‘warehouse receipt’ for deposited coins, and subsequently against a fractional reserve of coins or
metal.110 The power to issue banknotes was taken over by the Bank of England,111 with
convertibility ultimately ceasing to exist altogether in the course of the 20th century. 112 Using
funds on deposit at the central bank, commercial banks buy banknotes from the central bank and
sell them for use to the public, against funds held by their customers on deposit with them. As
they are exchanged out of and back into deposits “according to customer payment habits,” as a
form of cash, banknotes (together with coins), are not the principal form of money, a role now
preserved to money deposited in banks113
The integration of banks into a banking network, consisting of commercial banks
multilaterally clearing in a clearinghouse114 and settling on the books of the central bank which is
an integral part of this network, has led to a fundamental albeit subtle change in the mode of the
creation of money through ‘banking’. Thus, deposits made to commercial banks are typically not
While certainly there was rivalry the fact is that “many goldsmiths opened accounts with the Bank within a few
months of its creation”; Holden, supra note 9 at 93.
108
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109
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anymore in the form of specie or commodity money. Rather, they are primarily created by
lending into customers’ deposit accounts. For its part, an addition to bank’s liquid assets is
typically made not in the form of specie or commodity money, but rather in the form of an
increase in the sum credited to that bank’s own account; at least for a large bank such increase is
in the credit to its account with the central bank.115 Other than by receiving an interbank
payment, liquidity designed to meet deposit obligations is obtained at least by a large
commercial bank, in the form of credit posted to its account with the central bank, through
borrowing in an interbank market, selling government securities, or as a last resort, borrowing
from the central bank.
At the same time, non-cash payment activity continues to be primarily carried out over
deposit accounts held in commercial banks. Monitoring depositors’ payment activity in accounts
continues to facilitate credit decision-making and lead to specialization in advancing
information-intensive non-traded loans, so as to continue to be a principal niche for a profitable
commercial banking business as well as effective financial intermediation for the economy as a
whole.116 This must be true also in an era where credit information may be available from other
sources such as credit bureaux.
The architecture, instruments and institutions of the English system spread globally. At
present, commercial banks take deposits from the public, lend into customers’ deposit accounts,
and provide payment services in conjunction with deposit accounts. In each country, at least all
major commercial banks clear multilaterally and settle over deposit accounts they hold with the
central bank.117 They also maintain correspondent relationships118 with local small banks as well
as with cross-border or overseas large banks, so as to create a global network over which in
principle non-cash payments can be made by any account holder to another in any currency.
Moreover, as a rule, paper money in the form of banknotes is issued in each country by its
central bank.
Banknotes, together with coins for small change, constitute cash (or currency). Payment
in cash is typically made face to face, without any intermediation. Noncash payments, whether
face to face or between distant parties, require intermediation. Where payer and payee hold their
respective accounts with the same bank a noncash payment is carried out by that bank debiting
the payer’s account and crediting that of the payee. Where payer and payee hold their respective
accounts at two banks which are correspondents a noncash payment involves debiting the
payer’s account by the payer’s bank, crediting the payee’s account by the payee’s bank, and
either debiting the account of the payer’s bank by the payee’s bank or crediting the account of
the payee’s bank by the payer’s bank. In a domestic payment system, at least all major banks
hold their accounts with the central bank so that the interbank component of payment between
two such banks is carried out as part of the multilateral interbank settlement on the books of the
See Michael McLeay, Amar Radia and Ryland Thomas, “Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1: Money creation in the
modern economy” (2014) Bank of England, online: <https://www.monetary.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/money-creation-in-the-modern-economy.pdf>, accessed 27 December 2017.
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central bank. Otherwise, a noncash payment requires a chain of settlements on correspondent
accounts, with or without settlement on the books of the central bank, or alternatively, one
settlement between correspondent banks followed by another settlement on the books of a central
bank. To take a simple example for the latter, the interbank component of a noncash payment in
Australian currency from a customer of Bank A in Canada to a customer of Bank B in Australia,
assuming that the two are non-correspondent major banks, is carried out by Bank A using its
correspondent, another Australian major bank, which in turn, settles with Bank B on the books of
the central bank of Australia.
Three principal features characterize payment services facilitated by the modern banking
system. First, value held on deposit with participating banks, often referred to as ‘bank money’
or more specifically, ‘commercial-bank money’ (or even ‘ledger money’), is denominated in and
is redeemable to fiat money (or banknotes), that is, an official currency or ‘legal tender’. Second,
such value is in the form of a claim in an account maintained with a bank. Typically, this is an
asset account; however, payment may be made by means of a credit card, in which case payment
is carried from the payer’s credit account rather than asset account having a positive balance in
bank money. Also in such a case, payment results in an increase in the sum of bank money
available to the payee in the payee’s asset account—while the payer becomes obligated to
reimburse the payer’s bank, typically (if not exclusively) in bank money (originating from the
payer’s asset account). Third, claims against the central bank, often referred to as claims to
‘central-bank money’, are available both to holders of fiat money/banknotes and the banks.119
The latter multilaterally settle their reciprocal claims on the books of the central bank.
Obligations on bank deposits payable on demand are referred to as ‘scriptural money’, being a
category covering both commercial and central bank money.120 In principle, the sum of
commercial bank money is a derivative of the sum of central bank money; the former
manipulated by the central bank’s power to set interest rates through the sale of government
securities to banks and/or lending to banks, primarily with the view of achieving price
stability.121 Gold reserves, which may be assets of a central bank, do not play any explicit role in
the creation of the money supply.122
The non-cash payment system is then premised on the use of ‘scriptural money.’ Its
architecture is centralized. Thereunder, a bank maintains deposit accounts for customers (who
thus keep with it commercial bank money). For its part, a large bank may also maintain deposit
accounts (in commercial bank money) for correspondent banks. Finally, the central bank
maintains settlement (deposit) accounts at least for large banks (which thus hold with it central
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For this term see: Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, “An Institutional Theory of Money”, in Mario Giovanoli and Diego
Devos, eds, International Monetary and Financial Law: The Global Crisis (Oxford: OUP, 2010) at 517 and 527.
121
See e.g.: Michael McLeay, Amar Radia and Ryland Thomas, “Money in the modern economy: an introduction”
BOE Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1 at 4; Michael McLeay, Amar Radia and Ryland Thomas, “Money in the modern
economy” BOE Quarterly Bulletin 2014 Q1 at 14; and B. Friedman, “The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central
Bank as an Army with Only a Signal Corps?” 2:3 International Finance 261, (1999).
122
For their function, see e.g. Ronan Manly, Why the World’s Central Banks hold Gold – In their Own Words,
posted on March 20, 2018 https://www.bullionstar.com/blogs/ronan-manly/worlds-central-banks-hold-gold-words/ ,
visited October 5, 2018
119

21

bank money).123 As a whole, the system can be visualized as a pyramid at whose head or apex
stands the central bank with which at least large banks hold accounts, and possibly with small
banks holding accounts with large banks. Individual and corporate customers are at the bottom or
base of the pyramid holding their accounts in banks (whether large or small).124
IV. The coming of the cyber age: Electronic payments, e-money, and access to central bank
balances
(i)

The advent of electronic banking and e-money

Historically, payment instructions accessing bank money were either oral or, more
typically, in writing. Use of telecommunication, first the telegraph and then the transatlantic
cable, goes back to mid-19th century.125 However, the watershed of electronic banking, where
payments are processed as well as transmitted electronically, is a development of the second part
of the 20th century. Once it became possible to transmit instructions from a computer or
computer terminal, the electronic funds transfer was born. Telecommunication in the electronic
age was originally on cable or wire;126 subsequently the wireless option became available,127 and
ultimately, instructions could be transmitted over the Internet.128
Security in electronic funds transfer has been implemented by the physical protection of
network components129 and more recently by the introduction of tamper-resistant access devices
and cryptographic data protection. Broadly speaking, ‘cryptography’ (literally: secret writing)
denotes “a method of storing and transmitting data in a particular form so that only those for
123
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whom it is intended can read and process it.”130 Strictly speaking, the term points at a specific
method to that end, under which “complexity … is injected into data so that only those who
possess a key … can remove the complexity … and understand the intended message, while
those without the key will not be able to retrieve the hidden message in a timely manner.” The
“process of applying cryptography to a message so that only its intended readers can understand
it” is called ‘encryption’; the reverse, namely the “process of using a … key to recover the
intended message from its encrypted form,” is called ‘decryption.’ Where the sender and receiver
of a cryptographic message “share the same key data or mutually deducible key data,”
encryption is ‘symmetric’. Otherwise, where they do not share the same key data, encryption is
said to be ‘asymmetric’. Either way secrecy is achieved by means of the application of
mathematical theories. Cryptographic complexity addresses factors relating to the decryption of
the message and its result.131 Security is enhanced by the use of random data132 to generate keys,
since “patterns could be recognized [and] could aid in a brute-force attack.”133 Looking ahead,
security will be enhanced by the use of ‘quantum data,’ namely, data ‘marked’ by merely being
observed so as to alert the ultimate (designated) recipient to the fact that communication had
been intercepted.134
Developments exploiting such technological achievements have not been limited to
communication. It became also possible to ‘load’ monetary value (that is, value denominated in
an official or, in fact, any unit of account) on a tamper-resistant stored-value device such as a
card or personal computer. In such a case, the value became known as ‘electronic money’ or ‘emoney’. The majority of e-money schemes have involved “balance-based” products. In such
products, devices store and manipulate a numeric ledger, with transactions performed as debits
or credits to a balance. Accordingly, this type of e-money is a monetary balance or value
recorded electronically on and is available from a stored-value product (SVP), such as a chips
card, or a hard drive in a personal computer, or a server.135 Such a record, accessible from the
device without resort to the bank’s computer system, can be viewed as a decentralized bank
account.136 E-money is said to “differ … from so-called access products, which are products that
allow consumers to use electronic means of communication to access otherwise conventional
payment services” in and out bank accounts.137
See definition of “cryptography” online: <http://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/definition/cryptography>,
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A minority of e-money products may still operate on devices that store electronic "notes"
(sometimes called coins or tokens) that are uniquely identified by a serial number and are
associated with a fixed, unchangeable denomination. In such a "note-based" model, transactions
are performed by transferring notes from one device to another, and the balance of funds stored
on a device is thus the sum of the denominations of all notes on the device. However, as in the
“balance-based” products, transferability is typically restricted, and consumer cardholders may
usually make payments only to merchants who may clear these payments or deposit the
accumulated balances exclusively through their acquiring banks.138 Such a product provides the
link between traditional value-transfer systems to innovative circulating digital coins discussed
in Part V.
Under a variant of a “balance-based” e-money product, monetary value is not loaded on
the device; rather, it is available from a master account, belonging to the issuer or someone
acting on the issuer’s behalf.139 As in the case of e-money, monetary value is not available from
the payer-debtor’s own bank account.140 However, such prepaid value is in a bank account, even
if not that of the payer. Its use entails communication to the issuer and requires the cardholder to
access a bank account (even if not his or hers). From this perspective, a prepaid product device is
more a variant of an access device rather than of an SVP.
According to Crawford, e-money is truly ‘money’ when it may circulate from one
person to another, that is, from one SVP to another, without being ‘cleared’ or intermediated by
the issuer.141 This seems to me to be true for both “balance-based” and “note-based” e-money
products. However, upon reflection also, e-money, in all its manifestations, is ultimately a
variant of ‘bank money’;142 thus, whether e-money is purchased in cash or by means of a debit to
the purchaser’s bank account, the issuer has its own bank account credited with the amount sold
to the purchaser. Where the e-money is purchased from a bank the account credited is the reserve
account of the selling bank. Payment in e-money is forwarded to the payee’s bank which credits
the payee’s account with the amount of payment and forwards the e-money itself for redemption
against the value previously credited to the seller’s account. In the final analysis, even where prepaid value or e-money is not issued by a bank, a scheme must facilitate the purchase and
redemption through banks.
‘Electronic banking’ enhanced payment services in several other ways. First, it
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introduced electronic processing also to paper-based instruments such as cheques.143 Second, it
facilitated new as well as variations of existing products.144 Third, new players, such as money
transmitters145 or payment institutions,146 and e-money institutions147 entered the scene as endpayment institutions in a payment transaction, facilitating domestic and international payments in
small amounts to parties who do not have bank accounts. Fourth, the power balance in the
partnership between financial institutions and telecommunication carriers has shifted, allowing
the latter a greater voice and share in the payment market.148 Fifth, in facilitating instant
communication, electronic banking allowed the use of risk reduction methods as well as instant
authorization leading to an immediate final credit to the payee’s account way ahead of the
interbank settlement; such may be the case in domestic large value wholesale payment
systems149, and retail fast payments networks.150 This is also the case in a typical credit card
payment, even when it is carried internationally.151
Electronic banking facilitated branchless banking to the detriment of banks with a large
See in general e.g. Benjamin Geva, “Is Death of the Paper Cheque Upon Us? The Electronic Presentment and
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European Union 23.12. 2015, L 337/35, online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32015L2366>, accessed 28 December 2017 to mean: “a legal person that has been
granted authorisation in accordance with Article 11 to provide and execute payment services throughout the
[European] Union.” The term does not include credit institution (bank), electronic money institution, or post office
giro institutions. See Article 1(1).
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Defined under Article 2(1) of the DIRECTIVE 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
September 2009 on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions
amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC repealing Directive 2000/46/EC, Official Journal of the European
Union, 10.10. 2009. L 267/7, online: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0110>, accessed 27 December 2017, to mean: “a person that has been
granted authorisation under Title II to issue electronic money.”
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See e.g. document issued by the Canadian Bankers Association (CBA), Canadian NFC Mobile Payments
Reference Model, Version 1.03, 14 May 2012, online:
<https://www.cba.ca/Assets/CBA/Files/Article%20Category/PDF/msc_20120514_mobile_en.pdf>, accessed 28
December 2017
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See e.g. the large value wholesale payment system in Canada where finality of payment is guaranteed by the
central bank prior to the completion of settlement. CPSS, Core Principles, supra note 117 at 30, online:
<https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d43.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017.
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2016), online: <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d154.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017.
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branch network.152 As well, possible impact of electronic banking on monetary policy has been
fiercely debated.153 At the same time, none of the various facets of electronic banking has
affected the architecture of the payment system even as it expanded its scope and globalized it.
No wonder, the law governing wireless instructions is the same as the one governing wire
orders.154 For their part, money transmitters, payment institutions as well as e-money institutions
have been using banks as intermediaries in the transfers in which they participate at either end of
the transaction.155 They thus increased rather than decreased payment intermediation.
Furthermore, not treating such institutions as deposit takers hinges on a ‘benevolent’ strict view
of ‘deposit taking’ so as to exclude the delivery of money for a specific purpose.156 True, a
payment instruction issued from a digital device such as a mobile phone rather than from a
computer terminal or computer is often said to result in a mobile payment. When the payment
scheme is operated over mobile devices it is even described as involving ‘mobile money’.
However, in substance, payment orders initiated from a digital or mobile device is a specie of an
electronic funds transfer.157 For its part ‘mobile money’ is a form of ‘e-money’. It is therefore
confusing to treat such developments as reflecting a “digitization of state-issue currenc[y]” even
in connection with an on-line (e-commerce) transaction.158 Ultimately, efficiency is bound either
to turn payment institutions into banks or for banks take over payment institutions, either directly
or as subsidiaries, so as to eliminate this unnecessary layer of intermediation. The issue for banks
is the adoption of a different level of service rather than the elimination of banks as an essential
component in linking between payers and payees.
The broader question however is whether ‘electronic banking’ has not been superseded
by ‘Fintech,’ ’snatching’ money and payments from the banking system. Fintech refers to the use

Hanno Beck, “Banking is essential, banks are not. The future of financial intermediation in the age of the
Internet” (2001) 3:7-22 Economic Research and Electronic Networking, online:
<https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1023%2FA%3A1009927623530.pdf>, accessed 9 January 2018.
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See e.g. Benjamin J Cohen, “Electronic money: New day or false dawn?” (2001) 8:2 Review of International
Political Economy 197, online:
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233010154_Electronic_money_New_day_or_false_dawn>, accessed 9
January 2018.
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See e.g. Benjamin Geva, “The Wireless Wire: Do M-Payments and UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Credit Transfers Match?” (2011) 27:2 BFLR 249.
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See e.g. CPSS and the World Bank, General principles for international remittance services (Basel: BIS and the
World Bank, January 2007), online: <https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d76.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017.
For a critical analysis see e.g. Benjamin Geva and Muharem Kianief, “Reimagining E-Money: Its Conceptual
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677-79.
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of technology by IT firms159 to deliver financial solutions directly to purchasers of financial
products such as payment services.160 Technology designed to deliver financial solutions is
however available also to banks whether directly or indirectly by purchase from IT firms.
Alternatively, IT firms may become banks and compete with existing banks on equal footing. It
is not that ‘banking’ survives while banks die;161 rather, as an economic model banking has
adopted new technologies to be used by old and new types of institutions. Whether and to what
extent this remains true in light of subsequent developments is discussed further below.
(ii)

Availability of central bank account balances and their equivalents to the public

In reviewing the present architecture of the payment system prior to the Fintech era
Goodfriend opined that “… although valuing deposits at par and holding fractional reserves is
efficient for individual banks, it had the potential for generating destabilizing systemwide bank
runs.” In his view this risk is however “remedied efficiently by central bank monetary policy,”162
as well as by other payment system policies.163 Conversely, reviving and building on old
ideas,164 a recent set of proposals will make central bank money deposits available to the public
either directly or indirectly.165 A typical rationale, premised on new technological developments,
is that:
Central banking evolved at a time when service provision in local branches was
integral to providing banking services. In that world it made sense for the central
bank to ‘wholesale’ its core exchange settlement and liquidity support services to
banks which would then ‘retail’ them to individuals and businesses via their
branches, passbooks and cheque accounts. It was impracticable for central banks’
services to be provided to individuals.
At the same time, the rationale goes on, “[m]odern technology enables us to extend some core
central banking services to individuals and businesses.”166 As a matter of history, the argument is
doubtful, as post Medieval public banks, discussed in Part III(ii) above, ‘retailed’ their services
to the public. At the same time, it is true that with the increase in the size and geographical scope

Generally speaking, IT “deals with the technology part of any information system, and as such deals with hardware,
servers, operating systems and software etc.” See e.g. <http://www.differencebetween.com/difference-betweeninformation-systems-and-vs-information-technology/>, accessed 28 December 2017.
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A broader definition under which Fintech “refers to the use of technology to deliver financial solutions”, as in at
6, will encompass the use of technology by banks such as in electronic banking, and hence is unhelpful for the
purposes of this paper.
161
As claimed by “clever consultants” according to “Unresolved,” the Economist September 8 th, 2018. 20 at 21.
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Goodfriend supra note 32 at 248.
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Goodfreind, ibid at 261.
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For detailed discussions see references in sources cited in notes 171 and 172 infra.
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Unfortunately it has become common to treat such a proposal as relating to central bank digital currency. See e.g.
see Michael D Bordo and Andrew T Levin, “Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy”
(2017) NBER, Working Paper 23711, online: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w23711>, accessed 28 December 2017.
Digital currencies (in the true sense of the term) are discussed in Part V infra.
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Nick Gruen, Central Banking for all: A Modest Proposal for Radical Change (London: Nesta, March 2014) at 7,
online: https://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/central_banking_for_all.pdf, accessed 28 December 2017.
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of the bank customer base, a centralized system is workable only in an enhanced technology
environment. Hence, banking-centralization proposals merit consideration.
One proposal premised on this rationale is the provision of payment services to the public
exclusively by a designate government agency that will take deposits from the public but will
have restricted investment powers so as to be able to invest only in safe assets such as supercollateralized real estate mortgages. Under that proposal, payment transactions will be carried
out over deposit accounts with respect to which the liability of the depositary (the government
agency) is effectively secured by investment in high quality assets. On this basis, such deposits
will benefit from unlimited guarantee of the central bank. Under that proposal, commercial banks
will be able to lend to customers and sell them investment products but be precluded from
providing payment services.167
However, one may reasonably suppose that in upsetting the delicate balance between the
roles of the public and private sectors in the monetary and payment systems, this proposal will be
perceived as going too far (or in fact, nowhere). Certainly, in monopolizing payment services in
the hands of a government agency, the proposal will stifle competition and give no incentive to
innovate. Furthermore, the proposal is not persuasive in mandating central bank guarantee on the
top of the requirement to invest deposited funds in safe assets. I therefore doubt that in a
capitalist economy that proposal will persuade policy makers. At the same time, unclothing it
from these objectionable elements, the proposal is a reminiscent of an earlier idea, that of
‘narrow banking’; thereunder payment transactions are carried out over bank deposits of which
the proceeds are invested in safe assets.168 ‘Narrow banking’ does not require the
superimposition of central bank guarantee and in fact does not alter the traditional roles of
commercial banks as deposit takers, providers of payment services, and lenders.
Under another proposal the central bank will open accounts and offer payment services
directly to the public. This proposal is however said to impose “a large administrative burden” on
the central bank that “could distract it from its other functions in [regulating] and managing
monetary policy.” It is further acknowledged that under the proposal the central bank, “a stateowned enterprise,” would undertake pure market functions, in which it “would have no
commercial incentive to innovate [payment] services.”169 To meet these objections, under a
variant, it is proposed that public access to scriptural central bank money or its equivalent will be
indirect.170
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Ibid, passim. In the UK, he designates the National Savings and Investments (NS&I) as the appropriate
governmental agency. At the moment the NS&I accepts deposits from the public (up to prescribed ceilings) and
places them in savings accounts from which payment services cannot be provided. In Gruen’s words, “what is being
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There are however two alternative approaches to such a variant. One is premised on ‘full
reserve banking’171 while the other is of ‘plain sovereign money’.172 Briefly stated, under the
former, the entire quantity of commercial bank money, namely, the total amount of demand
deposits with banks, is to be backed by 100% reserve of central bank money held by commercial
banks on deposit with the central bank.173
Under the latter, that of ‘plain sovereign money,’174 the distinction between the two types
of scriptural money is abolished; what exists is only one category of scriptural money, central
bank money.175 It will be available to members of the public in accounts on the books of the
central bank; unless operated by the central bank itself, as discussed above, such accounts will be
operated through and managed by commercial banks,176 possibly in ‘transaction accounts’177
which will be distinguished from ‘investment accounts’ of which funds may be invested in
designated collections of assets of a broadly similar risk profile. Each investment fund will be a
distinct legal and corporate entity. Lending will be carried out of investment funds (possibly as
well as from long-term borrowing from the public) and should not create additional money or
purchasing power.178 Investment account holders will bear the risk of non-payment on due date,
and not being available to them prior to that, sovereign money owed to them will not serve as
commercial bank money. Rather, prior to maturity on the investment account, sovereign money
deposited in them will be lent by the bank and thus will exclusively be used by borrowers from
the bank.179 Banking will thus fully reclaim its function as an intermediation between savers and
borrowers.
See e.g. Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, “The Chicago Plan Revisited” (2012) International Monetary Fund,
Working Paper WP/12/202, online: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12202.pdf>, accessed 28
December 2017; William R Allen, “Irving Fisher and the 100 Percent Reserve Proposal” (1993) 36:2 Journal of Law
and Economics 703, online: <http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/467295>, accessed 28
December 2017; and Lainà, supra note 168.
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accessed 28 December 2017. For a blueprint see Ben Dyson, Graham Hodgson & Frank van Lerven, Sovereign
Money – An Introduction (London: Positive Money, 2016), online: <http://positivemoney.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/SovereignMoney-AnIntroduction-20161214.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017.
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Under both approaches commercial banks will cease to create money by lending into
customers’ deposits. Money creation will be under the exclusive power of the central bank180
with commercial banks either being limited to issue its ‘replication’ or ‘shadow’ to the public,
but not expand its quantity (under the full reserve banking alternative), or being restrained from
issuing it at all (under the plain sovereign money alternative).181 They will however be able to
lend and provide payment services.
An analysis of the pros and cons of each alternative, vis-à-vis each other as well as by
reference to the current fractional reserve regime, is beyond the scope of this paper as well as of
the competence of this author. At the same time, in relation to the topic at hand, under both
alternative banks will continue to accept deposits, make loans (albeit not out of demand
deposits), and provide payment services. For sure, they may face competition from ‘payment
institutions’ that do not provide ‘investment accounts’ services as well as lenders providing
‘investment accounts’ but not ‘payment accounts.’ However, it is reasonable to expect that such
competitors will be regulated, respectively on the payment, and saving and lending sides, so it
will be for banks to leverage the combined services they give to their advantage. For example, as
now, monitoring the payment activity of a customer will help a bank in making its lending
decision regarding that customer. Hence, a reform under any of these lines will not change the
role of commercial banks in the paymengvt system.
What may however change is the legal underpinning of the bank’s liability for money
deposited in the payments or transactions account. At the moment, a bank is liable to a depositor
on a simple debt since money deposited belongs to the bank which can use it as it wishes.182
Conversely, under a ‘full reserve banking’ scheme, the bank’s obligation may be conceptualized
by analogy to that of a securities intermediary that under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code in the United States183 as well as under the Uniform Securities Transactions Act in
Canada.184 According to this legislation, under the ‘indirect holding’ regime, a securities
intermediary is liable to an investor on a ‘securities entitlement’ against which the securities
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intermediary must maintain 100% ‘financial asset’.185 At the same time, under a ‘plain sovereign
money’ regime the customers will be entitled from their banks under an ‘irregular deposit’ which
envisages a claim premised on an unidentified portion of a mixture of fungible assets (e.g.
money) to which ownership passed to the depositary from the various depositors.186
In the final analysis, technological feasibility does not necessarily lead to economic
justification. For example, as pointed out at the beginning of this section, albeit ahead of Fintech,
Goodfriend was on record highlighting the public’s substantial efficiency gains of the fractional
reserve at the cost of accepted risks, which are anyway mitigated by monetary policy, central
bank lending and deposit insurance.187 To say the least, under the present system, banks are able
to share with customers profit realized from lending out of demand deposits; the chance is that,
in a regime under which scriptural central bank money is available to the public in any form,
payment services will be more costly. Whether and to what extent gains in safety outweigh
efficiency losses may be in the eyes of the beholder. This Section should be taken as outlining
banks’ continued role and relative advantage in a central bank scriptural money environment
rather than necessarily to unequivocally support such a regime.
V. Cryptocurrencies: heralding a new form of money and payment disintermediation?
Innovations discussed above were accessing accounts and transacting digitally,
expressing value on the screen of a digital device, storing value in an SVP so as to give rise of emoney, and making central bank money or its equivalent available to the public. All have not
changed the nature of an interbank transfer as a transfer of scriptural money in the form of a
balance of monetary value. Nor have they changed the role of the bank as a payment
intermediary.
This does not appear to be the case with the emergence of digital currencies. Very much like an
electronic payment instruction, a digital coin consists of encrypted data expressed in strings of bits.
However, as “an entity that amounts to a string of bits,” a coin ‘s string have a numerical value as well as
a unique identity.188 Like physical coins and banknotes, digital coins are not paid out of bank accounts so
that their payment does not appear to require intermediation. And yet exactly as the electronic funds
transfers they are paid with over the cyber space.
The ensuing discussion excludes currencies not linked to the real economy189 and is limited to
See in general e.g. Benjamin Geva, “Securities Transfers in the Indirect Holding System – Law Reform in
Canada in the Footsteps of UCC Article 8” (2007) 18 Journal of Banking and Financial Law and Practice (Australia)
72-77.
186
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the Institutes of Justinian, 4th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1956) at 295 and R. Zimmermann, The Law of
Obligations-Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Cape Town: Juta, 1990) at 215-19.
187
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schemes with unidirectional flow, under which the currency may originally be purchased with a fiat
currency but may not be converted back to it, such as Facebook Credits, and even; iii) schemes with a
bidirectional flow, envisaging conversion in both directions, albeit usually not used in entirely open loops
throughout the entire economy, such as air miles in Frequent Flyer Programs
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coins that could be liquefied and redeemed, so as to be available for use in real trading, as well as for
purchase of goods and services. Payment by such digital coins has the potential of bypassing both the
bank account and the centralized multilateral interbank settlement.

A digital currency may be issued either privately or by a central bank.190 When it is issued
privately it may have its own unit of account.191 Either way, a scheme in which coins are issued
and redeemed under a centralized protocol is said to be centralized.192 A digital currency that is
issued, transferred, and redeemed over a distributed ledger is decentralized. Finally, a digital
currency transferable over a distributed ledger and yet issued by a centralized operator is
hybrid.193
The distributed ledger underlying decentralization is an asset database that can be shared
across a network of multiple sites, geographies or institutions.194 Blockchain is an underlying
technology, requiring the Internet to support and maintain its peer-to-peer network, that enables
digital implementation of a distributed ledger. Being a computerized ledger on a distributed
network, it generates a single version of the record on each computer and in essence is:195
a type of a database that takes a number of records and puts them in a block …
Each block is then ‘chained’ to the next block, using a cryptographic signature.
This allows block chains to be used like a ledger, which can be shared and
corroborated by anyone with the appropriate permissions.
Accuracy of the ledger is corroborated under a method determined under rules adhered by
See European Central Bank/Eurosystem, Virtual Currency Schemes (October 2012) at 12–15, online:
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2018. For an
explanation as to why such a currency will not "migrate" to the real economy, see, e.g. Gans and Halaburda, supra
note 158.
190
For the latter, see e.g. CPMI, Central bank digital currencies (Basle: BIS, March 2018), online:
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf (visited October 07, 2018). See also Norges Bank Papers NO 1. 2018:
Central bank digital currency, on line: https://static.norgesbank.no/contentassets/166efadb3d73419c8c50f9471be26402/nbpapers-1-2018centralbankdigitalcurrencies.pdf?v=05/18/2018121950&ft=.pdf , accessed October 7, 2018
191
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privately issued digital currency) in IMF Staff Discussion, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations
(January 2016), at 7 available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf [Accessed 21
September 2016].
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etc. Elsvier, 2015), at 7, who use it to denote “closed system[s} with transactions within specific entities” in such
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UK Government Office for Science, “Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain" (2016) at 17–18,
online: <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributedledger-technology.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017.
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UK Government Office for Science, Ibid at 17. See also e.g. CPMI, Distributed ledger technology in payment,
clearing and settlement system – An analytical framework (Basel: BIS, February 2017), online:
<http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d157.pdf>, accessed 28 December 2017; and David Mills, Kathy Wang et al.,
“Distributed ledger technology in payments, clearing and settlement” (2016) Federal Reserve Board Division of
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-095, online:
<https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016095pap.pdf> , accessed 28 December 2017.
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participants. Record security and visibility to authorized users is ensured by cryptography.
A “cryptocurrency” denotes a digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to
regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the execution of payment transactions 196
on a decentralized network. Cryptography is thus used in cryptocurrencies to express and protect
the value of the coins (the sequence of the bits), to prevent counterfeiting and fraudulent
transactions, as well as to perform the validation and execution of transactions records via a
distributed ledger, such as the blockchain. Each block contains a cryptographic hash197 or
algorithm that links it to the previous block along with a timestamp for the transactions from that
block. The network allows online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without
going through a bank or any other centralized counterparty.198
The pioneering digital cash scheme, and the most prominent one so far, is Bitcoin.199
Being “the first and still the most popular cryptocurrency,” it began life as a techno-anarchist
project to create an online version of cash, a way for people to transact without the possibility of
interference from malicious governments or banks”200 It is a virtual,201 self-anchored202
cryptocurrency and a peer-to-peer decentralized system.203 In his seminal paper,204 its
196
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mythological founder Satoshi Nakamoto defined Bitcoin as an “electronic coin” consisting of a
“chain of digital signatures” transferable from the payer to the payee “by digitally signing a hash
of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding them to the end of
the coin.”. Premised on distributed ledger technology (DLT), Bitcoin was born out of an
ambition to create government-independent, censorship-resistant money.
Bitcoin network consists of independent nodes, each operated by a ‘miner’. Miners then
bundle each proposed payment with others and create a new block for the blockchain. The new
block is hashed and, together with other data, is rehashed. The data is repeatedly fed through a
cryptographic ‘hash’ function. The hash is put into the header of the proposed block and
becomes the basis for a mathematical puzzle. The ‘miners’ compete to reach a solution for it, and
the first to come up with the right solution, as accepted by the majority of miners who submitted
‘proof of work’,205 is rewarded with newly ‘minted’ bitcoins. The mathematical puzzle is hard to
solve, but once found, it is easy for the network to confirm that the answer is correct. Nodes
accept the block, whose header contains the hash of the previous block’s header, by adding it to
the chain that stretches back to the first Bitcoin block (the genesis block), containing the first
transaction in the Bitcoin network. This construction is designed to make the Bitcoin blockchain
tamperproof: if one tries to fake a transaction by changing a block that had already been stored in
the blockchain that block’s hash would be different and ought to be apparent to all as having
been tampered with. The ‘coin’ thus carries with it its entire history so that each payment
becomes part of its code.
Payments are made from one Bitcoin wallet to another. Each such wallet is a computer
file or a software program which has an email address. The wallet stores both the private key (in
effect the passcode) and the bitcoin206 balance controlled by it. What is transferred is ‘monetary
fluid’ representing the bitcoin sum accessed from the payer’s wallet and originating from all
Bitcoin ‘coins’ accessed from that wallet.207 Stated otherwise, a payer is unable to designate and
set aside for payment any particular bitcoin. In effect, payment can be made in any sum available
from the wallet, and regardless, at the end of the process, new bitcoins become associated with
the payee’s wallet, while those still associated with the payer’s wallet may have changed their
value and hence their identity. Transaction output is thus said to differ from transaction input, if
only due to the diversified chain of provenance of input (from the payer’s wallet). It would have
been more accurate to speak of a Bitcoin payment resulting in a ‘coin’ being transformed rather
than transferred, except that each resulting ‘coin’ carries with it identities of its predecessors as
well as the impact of its subsequent partial use. Transaction information is stored on the
blockchain; strictly speaking, the ‘coins’ themselves are not discrete things and are thus not
stored anywhere. As a string of bits they however exist in the wallet so that to access them one
needs both the password and control over the physical device or cloud having the wallet. If the
‘Proof of Work’ is defined to require “that the decentralized participants that validate blocks show that they have
invested significant computing power in doing so.” See Fintechblue, “What is Proof of Work?” fintechblue, online:
<http://www.fintechblue.com/2016/06/what-is-proof-of-work/>, 28 December 2017. According to Satoshi
Nakamoto, ibid., “[p]roof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote,” rather than “one-IP address-one-vote”.
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device is lost, the use of the bitcoins remains available to the owner only where the wallet has
been backed up (and the one in the device possession as well as with knowledge of the passcode
has not spent them).208
It is argued that developers of cryptocurrencies "simply migrated the cryptographic tools
used to safeguard communication and applied them to safeguard digital currency". 209 Hence the
vulnerability to erosive cryptographic intractability from which Bitcoin suffers, in addition to its
vulnerability to potential leadership corruption.210 Also, its operation, whether in facilitating
payments, preventing double spending, or issuing new bitcoins, requires substantial
computational energy and is thus said to be wasteful.211 Bitcoin also suffers from poor
scalability, as it can handle at most 7 transactions per second,212 compared to Visa and
Mastercard that clear in a second 2,000 transactions,213 or even a peak-volume of 10,000
transactions per second.214
Certainly, however, Bitcoin is driven not only by technological innovation but also by
strong sentiments215 against currency systems based on bank credit216 and backed by
government.217 Its promoters cite its non-inflationary basis,218 partly attributed to the limitation
on the number of bitcoins to be generated by its protocol. Indeed, in general, Bitcoin’s value is
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premised on its scarcity;219 its specific value as a monetary asset, in fact ‘hard money’, is the
result of its high ratio of the stock to the flow.220 At the same time, in the long run, the finite
number of bitcoins in existence may prove to adversely affect both prices and liquidity.221
Furthermore, the current 21 million cap is not engraved in stone and is thus subject to change.222
Regardless, as a self-anchored digital currency, Bitcoin is a mathematical creature; being
unsupported by the economic might of an issuer,223 its principal weakness lies in the inherent
instability of its value.224 In the absence of any “objective rational[e] for any exchange value”
Bitcoin is thus likened to “a game that triggered universal interest … [but whose] infirmity is as
intrinsic as Monopoly money.” Last but not least, a competitor’s self-anchored math-based
currency may emerge and thereby lower the Bitcoin value. This casts a shadow on the
acceptability of Bitcoin as a real substitute to fiat currency.225
It has specifically been suggested that to meet its unstable value, Bitcoin should be
pegged in one way or another to the value of a specific fiat currency or commodity.226 Albeit this
can be done only at a heavy ideological cost to its promoters, who highlight Bitcoin’s
independence from any outside control on both the quantity and the value.
Other than scalability and an unstable value, the principal hurdle for a universal
acceptance of cryptocurrencies in general and Bitcoin in particular as the money of the future is
that decentralization and the resulting absence of a trusted central counterparty may be more of a
curse than a blessing.227 In other words, efficiency gains in cutting out intermediaries come at
costs which outweigh benefits.228 According to Saifeadean Ammous, inefficiency is inherent in
the blockchain technology in general and Bitcoin in particular:229
219

As pointed out by Saifedean Ammous, The Bitcoin Standard: The Decentralized Alternative to Central Banking
(Hoboken NJ: Wiley, 2018) at 177, speaking of Bitcoin designer Nakamoto as the inventor of ‘digital scarcity’. For
scarcity as the source for the value of a monetary asset see Karl Polyani, “The Semantic of Money Use” in G Dalton
(ed.), Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polyani, (Darden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968) at
175, 197.
220
Ammous, The Bitcoin Standard ibid. at 5-6, 23, 155, and 199-200.
221
Samid, supra note 129 at 113.
222
Hoegner, ed, supra note 203 at 1, 9 n. 57.
223
Samid, supra note 129 at 14-16.
224
For a discussion on the nature of Bitcoin value, see e.g. William J. Luther, “Is Bitcoin Intrinsically Worthless?”
(July 2017), online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000068, accessed 28 December 2017.
225
Samid, supra note 188 at 14-15 (for an illustration of instability), and 109-110 (for connection between selfanchoring and instability). The quotation is from p. 15.
226
Samid, ibid at 114–121. Cf. e.g. NationCoin, being a proposed Regulated and Sovereign Backed Cryptocurrency
(RSBC). Its scheme envisages cryptocoins, which as in Bitcoin, will be created by and transacted over a blockchain.
However, upon their creation, cryptocoins will be stored, and released to the public by a Digital Asset Reserve, as
RSBC, at the fixed value of the national unit of account. Transactions are to be verified by ‘miners’ who will be paid
freshly minted cryptocoins. See Kartik Hegadekatti and Yatish S G, “Generation, Security and Distribution of
MationCoins by a Sovereign Authority” (7 Jan 2017), online:
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888347>, accessed 28 December 2017.
227
For an interesting historical study on the lessons from the misfortune of such absence see eg. Isabel Schnabel and
Hyun Song Shin, Money and trust: lessons from the 1620 for money in the digital age (Basel: BIS, February 2018)
online: <https://www.bis.org/publ/work698.pdf>, accessed 12 March 2018.
228
A point highlighted Mark Carney, Speech: The Future of Money (Bank of England, March 2, 2018) at 6-9,
online: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2018/the-future-of-money-speech-by-markcarney.pdf?la=en&hash=A51E1C8E90BDD3D071A8D6B4F8C1566E7AC91418 .
229
Ammous, supra note 213 at 2.

36

Bitcoin has a blockchain not because it allows for faster cheaper transactions, but
because it removes the need to trust in third party intermediation transactions are
cleared because nodes compete to verify them, yet no node needs to be trusted. It
is unworkable for third party intermediaries to imagine they could improve their
performance by employing a technology that sacrifices efficiency and speed
precisely to remove third party intermediaries. For any currency controlled by a
central party, it will always be more efficient to record transactions centrally.
Whether removing third party intermediation is a strong enough advantage to
justify the increased inefficiency of distributed ledgers is a question that can only
be answered over the coming years in the test of market acceptance of digital
currencies. What can be clearly seen is that blockchain payment applications will
have to be with the blockchain’s own decentralized currency, and not with
centrally-controlled currencies.
Elsewhere Ammous explains that it is the high processing power threshold which
prevents both hacking and the establishment of a central control. Both achievements secure
neutrality and full benefit of decentral structure for Bitcoin, and yet at the cost of a fixed supply
of growth that cannot be made to adjust to satisfy a purely market-determined demand and hence
results in price instability. At the same time, he observes, attempts in other currencies to bypass
the expensive, inefficient and wasteful Proof of Work (PoW), by other settlement mechanisms
such as Proof of Stake,230 consensus, or a trusted notary, compromise the neutrality of the
system, enhance the control of the issuer, and/or require a third party verificator, all at the
expense of the DLT premises. Hence, he concludes, Bitcoin could be no more than a store of
value,231 while other cryptocurrencies cannot fulfill any monetary feature.232
Ammous does not see the deflationary nature of Bitcoin as an impediment to its unit of
account function. At the same time, having highlighted Bitcoin’s inadequacy to serve as a
medium of exchange for everyday transactions, he argues that Bitcoin may be “the best store of
value humanity ever invented” so as to be capable of functioning as “a reserve currency” to be
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held by banks in cold storage.233 Against the Bitcoin reserve banks will perform payment
transactions by debiting payers’ accounts and crediting those of payees. With Bitcoin reserve
banks will settle. However, other than eliminating the central bank, this model will mimic the
role of banks in relation to payments in fiat currencies so that everyday Bitcoin transactions will
be carried out 'off-chain' in effect through banks or similar deposit taking institutions.234
Drawbacks in the utilization of decentralized digital currency schemes have led the way
to the consideration of centralized digital currencies issued by trusted issuers such as either
central banks or private issuers. In the ongoing fight against counterfeiters and fraudulent copiers
centralized schemes are better positioned to apply superior defence measures in protecting the
integrity of the data base, as well as enhanced security procedures in both coin and identity
verification upon redemption and in trade. 235 This is without mentioning the higher scalability of
a centrally issued digital coin scheme. Two such technologies are set out below.
WingCash is a centralized system, allowing the issuer to determine the reserve
requirement, under which a claim-check to fiat currency may be issued.236 It has a multi-issuer
platform using a centralized model, allowing for the ledger to replicate in multiple locations.
Each claim-check is in the form of a unique web page with an immutably assigned web address
(URL), typically cryptographically signed by the issuer. It is described as a digital bearer
instrument with a fixed value which simulates a physical banknote. Each digital bearer
instrument has a single ‘possession’ attribute so that only the current holder can reassign
‘possession’ to another entity. The ledger immediately records the update to the ‘possession’
attribute to avoid the double-spending problem. As in the case of physical cash, the change of
possession from one holder to another constitutes a payment. Therefore, the ledger keeps a
record of the change of ‘possession’ of each bearer instrument. Digital notes may be redeemed to
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fiat currency in the form of either physical cash or bank money. Among 17 faster payments
solutions, 237 WingCash’s solution for digital Fedbotes238 came tied in the first place.239
The second technology is that of BitMint facilitating a centralized scheme for a nonspeculative and stable currency, consisting of randomized coins, each expressing a claim-check
to a defined quantity of a specific commodity, including a fiat currency.240 It may also be
cascaded so as to be denominated in a unit of account anchored on the value of two or more fiat
currencies, commodities, or indices.241 BitMint money is generated through an economical
quantum mechanical process,242which is energy-efficient and reduces waste. BitMint keeps
100% reserve so that the purchasing commodity or fiat currency is always available for
redemption on demand. BitMint is said to be identified as “the only candidate qualifying as a
universal digital representation of worldwide currencies.”243
BitMint currency is protected by quantum physics, not dependent on erosive encryption,
and claimed to be indefeasible by cyber threats. 244 It has a Validation Hierarchy under which
coins are validated through subordinate nodes and may be tethered245 so as to be “[m]oney with
built-in limitation on its use”246 such as where a coin is cryptographically linked to the rightful
owner.247 Tethering may also facilitate crypto-fusing contractual terms between payer to payee
into the money, so as to disallow any use that is in breach of the contract. BitMint money can be
split off or amalgamated at any desired resolution248 and can be paid continuously on a pay-asyou-go basis, e.g. as you pump gas into a car gas tank, rather than separately, e.g. upon the
“Strategies for Improving U.S. Payment System” (26 January 2015) Federal Reserve System, online:
<https://fedpaymentsimprovement.org/wp-content/uploads/strategies-improving-us-payment-system.pdf>, accessed
28 December 2017.
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completion of the service.
In the final analysis a centralized digital currency system is modeled on a “note-based”
e-money scheme discussed in Part IV, except that due to technological advancements the chance
is that it entails higher if not unlimited circulation of coins among a larger if not unlimited
number of participants. Facilitating payment from one device to another without communication
to a bank may revolutionize both payments and money holding patterns. However, inasmuch as
digital coins are to be bought with bank money and ultimately may be redeemed in bank money,
a centralized digital currency scheme, while being bound to change means and methods of
payment, will arguably not change fundamentals as to the quantity of money and the role of
banks in its creation and transmission. 249
Notwithstanding drawbacks set out earlier in this section, a few central bank
decentralized or hybrid digital currency schemes, namely using the blockchain at least for
settlement, have been floating.250 In the US, proposals have been made for Fedcoin, being a
central bank-issued centrally created cryptocurrency, to be available to the public at large. 251
Digital coins are to be centrally issued on a blockchain-style decentralized ledger, but
nevertheless with the central bank being in full control of quantity, timing, and fixed value ibn
denominations of the national fiat currency unit of account. Effectively, transactions will be
validated by an independent notary nominated by the central bank. A similar proposal was made
in the UK for RSCoin.252 Another proposal is for a NationCoin, being a Regulated and Sovereign
Backed Cryptocurrency (RSBC). The scheme envisages cryptocoins, which as in Bitcoin, will be
created by and transacted over a blockchain. Upon their creation, cryptocoins will be stored, and
released to the public by a Digital Asset Reserve, as RSBC, at the fixed value of the national unit
of account. Transactions are to be verified by ‘miners’ who will be paid freshly minted
cryptocoins.253
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As a proof of concept (PoC) both Bank of Canada under the Jasper Project254 and Monetary
Authority of Singapore under the Ubin Project255 experiment a DLT-based wholesale payment system
premised on the use of a blockchain for interbank settlement in central bank money. Thereunder, the
central bank issues to each participating bank digital depository receipts against the security of funds
withdrawn from the reserve account of that bank. For each payment order processed, interbank settlement
continuously takes place by transacting with these digital receipts over the blockchain. Both entered a

collaboration to test and develop a cross-border solution using crypto tokens issued by the two
central banks.256
In Jasper, Digital Depository Receipts (DDRs) issued by the Bank of Canada are secured
by an omnibus account in which each participating bank deposits central bank money withdrawn
from its settlement account. In Ubin, Depository Receipts (DRs) are issued by the Monetary
Authority to each participating bank against central bank money deposited by the latter in an
individual cash custody account held with the former. In Ubin participating banks may hold
deposit receipt balances on the blockchain overnight and have greater flexibility in pledging and
redeeming DRs during operating hours. In Jasper DDRs are created and destroyed upon
redemption on a daily basis.
Ubin uses a system built on the Ethereum platform. This was true for the first phase of
Jasper (Jasper 1). This platform uses Proof of Work (PoW) consensus protocol, requiring
expensive computations to validate transactions and update the ledger. For that reason the second
Kartik Hegadekatti and Yatish S G, “Generation, Security and Distribution of MationCoins by a Sovereign
Authority” (7 Jan 2017), online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888347>, accessed 28
December 2017.
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phase of Jasper (Jasper II) switched to the Corda platform in which a notary function replaces
that of the PoW:257 The notary role in Jasper II is assigned to the Bank of Canada. As such it has
access to the entire ledger and is able to verify that the funds involved in a transaction are
available.
Jasper II improved on both Jasper 1 and Ubin in facilitating a liquidity-saving mechanism
(LSM) in the form of a payment queue with periodic multilateral payment netting for payments
designated as ‘non-urgent’.
Both Jasper and Ubin have been successful as a proof of concept for a DLT-based
interbank settlement system that has the potential of replacing the traditional Real-time Gross
Settlement (RTGS). However, in assessing Jasper, it was concluded that: 258
•

For critical financial market infrastructures, such as wholesale payment systems, current
versions of DLT may not provide an overall net benefit relative to current centralized
systems. Recent versions of DLT have, however, made advances compared with initial
cryptocurrency applications of DLT.

•

Benefits for the financial system of a DLT-based wholesale payment system could likely
arise from its interaction with a larger DLT ecosystem of financial market infrastructures,
potentially including cross-border transactions

Ultimately, blockchain technology may supplement and be integrated into existing financial
infrastructure, and yet does not appear to replace it altogether.
VI.

Conclusion

In migrating “cryptographic tools used to safeguard communication and appl[ying] them
to safeguard digital currency"259 cryptocurrency developers effectively engineered payment
disintermediation. They did so by means of tools that originally fashioned to enhance payment
intermediation through safeguarding interbank as well as customer-to-bank and bank-tocustomer communication. Once issues of volatility, scalability and deflation are resolved,
cryptocurrencies have indeed the potential to generate means of payment “offering much of the
anonymity of cash while also allowing transactions at long distances” and yet “clear and settle
quickly without an intermediary.”260 Ironically then, it is the evolution of a process in banking,
enhancing payment intermediation, which could lead to the demise of banks as payment
intermediaries. The result will not change even if centralized digital currencies are to supersede
cryptocurrencies.
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However, in my view, the chance is that the demise of both banks and payment
intermediation will not happen or at least not anytime soon. Certainly, we shall see some
measure of payment disintermediation in the form of improved cryptocurrencies as well as
centralized digital currencies. At the same time, banks have been fighting back to improve their
own legacy systems. Thereby they may successfully compete with digital currency payment
services providers. For its part, a successful centralized digital currency system is likely to count
on commercial banks buying and selling the currencies into and out of accounts maintained with
them so as to become a universal “note-based” e-money scheme linked to banks and the legacy
monetary system.
Regardless, it is hard to see banks as both depositaries and lenders of money disappear.
Rather, they are likely to get themselves into the digital currency space and provide services as
well as be in a position to cover risks that customers would prefer not to incur on their own. As
well, there is a good chance that in competing with banks, IT firms issuers of digital currencies
will become rather than supersede banks. And even if crypto assets may one day reduce demand
for central bank money I doubt that the public will be ready to have control on the quantity of
money surrendered to digital currency developers. Whether centralized digital currencies are to
be traded with or issued by commercial banks, or whether central banks are to take over from the
private sector the issue of digital currencies, whether under a centralized or decentralized
scheme, changes to monetary policy will not be substantial even if the use of banks as payment
intermediaries will be affected.
Possibly, both practicalities and anti-money laundering & terrorist financing regulations
may limit the size of payments to be made in digital currencies. Furthermore, the chance is that
for a large payment, an RTGS system, with liquidity-saving mechanisms, settled between
commercial banks on the books of a trusted central bank, will be preferred by participants over a
large peer to peer digital cash payment between them.261 For now, the scope and magnitude of
future developments can only be speculated.
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